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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND
CHIGI'S CAREER TO 1870

The year 1870 was either an annee terrible or an annus
mirabilis for a good portion of Europe, depending on whether one's
country was the recipient of blessing or disaster.

The multitide of

writing on the events of that year will never cease, nor will the political effects still to be seen in contemporary Europe.

Discussion will

long endure of the contradictions of a liberal empire, a disputed candidacy, the editing of a dispatch, the mechanized invasion across the
Rhine~

the violent birth of a republic with a monarchist assembly,

the awkward proclaiming of an absolute empire, an infallible pope
without a country, and the verve of Roma Capitale.
Few could have been in a better position to be familiar with
I"

these events than Flavia Chigi (1810-1885), titular Archbishop of
Mira and Apostolic Nuncio to Paris.

As a key figure in the Paris

diplomatic world, chief spokesman for a worried pope before the
pontiff's protector, negotiator with the Iron Chancellor, and a fellow
traveler with a lost and uncertain provisional government, Chigi had
an excellent locus from which to observe the unfolding of a very
\
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complex and multi-faceted drama.

"Observe'' is the correct word

as Chigi 's direct influence in the story of 1870 was mini.ma!,

Rather

his role was one which put him officially and unofficially into close
contact with many elements and which makes him worthy of study.
Archbishop Chigi was as signed to Paris fro:n January of 1862
through May of 1874.

The years 1870 and 1871 were the busiest of

Chigi 1 s remarkably long tenure.

Only brief attention need be pa id

to Chigi's early career, the decade of the 18.60's, or to the post-war
years.

The main focus of this work will be the crucial twenty months

from January, 1870 to the end of August, 1871, that is, from the
start of Ollivier's ministry to the resignation of Favre and the aifirmation of Thie rs as President of the French Republic,
The duties of an apostolic nuncio, reflecting the duality of the
nineteenth century papacy,
Cathol~c

one.

wer~

twofold: the head of the Roman

Church then represented a spiritual domain and a temporal

The spiritual area was the pope's leadership of a world-wide

religion which had a very self-assured opinion of itself and its mis r

sion.

The temporal sphere, after

1860~

was a portion of the middle

segment of the Italian peninsula where Pius IX retained sovereignty
with the aid of Napoleon III's troops.

It was the era of the thorny

Roman Question.
The papal diplomatic agents could not escape this duality any
more than the popes could.

The duties and missions of nuncios
\
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involved both the spiritual life of the Catholic Church within the borders of the country to which they we re accredited and the pol i.tical
relations between two sovereignties.

On the spiritual side, the ma in

function of a nuncio was to act as official intermediary i.n the naming
of bishops of dioceses within the •1ation.

There were variations

among European states on how this was done.

Other "spiritual"

functions included forwarding letters of citizens to the Holy Father,
transmitting petitions of canonization, repor.ting personnel changes
among the important clergy, alerting the Vatican on potentially hereti.cal seminary professors and printed material, advising on the appearance of new cults, and collecting and dispatching the Peter's
Pence.

On the temporal or political side, a nuncio's duties corresponded to those of most regular' an: bas sadors: dealing with the
foreign minister on mutual matters, conveying news of foreign events
gained through diplomatic channels, reporting on internal political
developments, handling complaints of citizens, and maintaining a conr

stant attention to the attitude of the host country.:..toward the home
government.

1

1

vatican diplomatic terminology differs from the civil nomenclature. A "nuncio" is a full-ranked ambassador from the pope to a
country with which the Vatican has full diplomatic relations, A nuncio is not to be confused with an "apostolic delegate 11 which indicates
a Vatican representative to the Catholic Church within a country with
\
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In his years at Paris, Flavio Chigi's activities covered all

those duties.

But his was no ordinary ambassadorial position, com -

plicated as it was by the all-pervasive Roman Question.

Because of

the overriding importance of the Roman Question, attention is given
herein to the

'political-diplomatic" aspects of Ch.igi 1 s term,

Little

will be said about the ··spiritual" side though much could be done in
this regard as the Vatican documents are very full.
Since Chigi was at Paris for a full

tw~lve

years, any attempt

to deal fully with such a complex period as 1862 through 1874 would
involve a longer study than a dissertation requires.

The historical

literature for Franco-Vatican relations during Louis Napoleon 1 s reign
is virtually endless.

Works of all styles and prejudices can be found

in a number of languages.

The early 1870 1 s and beyond are less

covered than the previous epoch, largely due to the fact that until the
time of the Ralliement the story lacks earnestness or substantial
Some literature does exist if only in a relatively small

changes.
quantity.

2

which the Holy See does not have diplomatic relations. An apostolic
delegate does not normally deal with a civil government. A papal
"legate" is a personal emissary of the pope who is given full powers
of action in the area of his assignment as if he were the pope himself. A nuncio has far less power than a legate. Papal legates
have seldom been used since the time of the Reformation.
2

The principle works on Franco-Vatican relations in this
period are: Jean Maura in, La Politique Ecclesiatique du Second Em\
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It is the turnover period of the war years of 1870 and 1871

which remain the least investigated.

In order to show how a diplo-

matic agent worked in difficult and extraordinary circumstances and
to show how Vatican-French relations evolved in a ti.me when the
situation was so drastically altered for both governments, the narration will emphasize the critical years 1870 and 1871.
Such a stated purpose does not rule out a glance over Flavio
Chigi 's early career or the 1862 -1869 pe rio<;l.

It should be remem -

bered that the following is intended to be a glance and little more.
The intent is to show how the Vatican documents reflect the period
and how Chigi reacted to important crises.

The limited number of

French sources cited bring out the official government view of the
sometimes troublesome nuncio.
Flavio Chigi was born in Rome on May 31, 1810, a scion of
aristocratic Roman stock.

His father was Agostino Chigi-Albani,

a

Empire, de"l852
1869 (Pari.s, 1930); Lynn M. Case, Franco-Italian Relations, 1860-1865; the Roman Question and the Convention of
Sept ember (Philadelphia, 1932); S. William Halperin, Italy and the
Vatican at War. A Study of Their Relations from the Outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War to the Death of Pius IX (Chicago, 1939); E. E.
Y. Hales, Pio Nono: A Study in European Politics and Religion
the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1957); Lili.an Parker Wallace,
The Papacy and European Diplomacy, 1869-78 (Chapel Hill, 1947);
Evelyn Acomb, The French Laic Laws (New York, 1941); and Roger
Aubert, Le Ponti.Heat de Pie IX (Paris, 1952).
All of these works, with the exception of Maura in, mention
Chigi only in passing or not at all.

i::

\
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while his mother was Amelia Carlotta Barberini.

With this mixture

of Chigi, Albani, and Barberini, more noble blood could hardly be
found in Rome.

There had been four cardinals in the Chigi line, one

of whom was Fabio Chigi (1599-1667) who had served as papal nuncio
in France in the seventeenth century to the court of Louis XIV where
he struggled with the Sun King, Mazarin, and Jansenism.
Chigi was elected Pope Alexander VII in 1655.

Th.is Fabio

The Albani and the

Barberini likewise claimed several cardinals and one pope each,
Clement XI and Urban VIII respectively.

3

In 1836, Flavia Chigi entered the Pontifical Nobel Guard, the

military unit which served as a ceremonial bodyguard for the pope
and was open only to sons of Roman noble families.

Several French

and Italian sources indicate that during this stage of his life, Chigi
followed a very worldly course ~nd was one of the noted revellers of
Roma~

'

society.

4

3

Most of this biographical information is gained from: Dictionnaire d 'Histoire et de G~ographie Eccl~siastique (Paris, 1953),
Vol. 12, p. 685; from an obituary in La Civilta_:Cattolica, February
23, 1885, pp. 613-614, Vol IX della serie duodecima (Vol. 141 in
/
total series); and "Chigi, Flavia" entry in La Grande Encyclopedie:
Inventaire Raisonne des Science, des Lettres, et des Arts (Paris,
1886-1902), Vol. XI, p. 26.

4

Raffaele de Cesare, Roma e lo Stato del papa dal ritorno di
Pio IX al XX settembre (Roma, 1907)- -English translation The Last
Days of Papal Rome (London, 1909), p. 324 and resume on Chigi,
Archives du Ministre des Affaires Etrang~res, Mlmoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 109, fols. 16-17. The French Foreign Ministry
\
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In 1849, Chigi. left Rome and went to Gaeta to join his selfexiled pontiff, Pi.us IX, who had gone there to escape the Garibaldian
uprising in the Eternal City.

At some point in this sojourn, for

reasons unclear, Flavio decided to embrace an ecclesiastical career.
An official French report drawn up years later indicated that he expressed this desire to none other than Pius IX himself who urged
Chigi along.

5

Chigi took up seminary studies in Tivoli, northeast of Rome,
and was ordained within a few years at the age of 42.
Vatican ranks was quick.
Peter's.

His rise in the

In 1853, he was named a Canon of St.

In 1855 he became a domestic prelate with the rank of

Secret Chamberlain on Active Duty to the Person of the Holy Father.
The following year, at age 46, Chigi was consecrated Titular Archbishop of Mira in partibus and ~,ras sent immediately as Nuncio Extraordinary to represent Pius IX at the coronation of Czar Alexander II
of Russia.

Upon his return from St. Petersburg, Chigi was appoint-

ed Apostoli.£ Nuncio to Bavaria.

He served at Muni.ch until hi.s

appointment to Paris in late 1861.

Archives are hereinafter cited as AMAE. This resume is from a
collection drawn up in 1877 on all members of the College of Cardinals in the eventuality of a papal election. Chi.gi had become a
cardinal in 1874 and was living i.n Rome in 1877.
5

AMAE, loc. cit.
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Chigi 1 s assignment to Paris was enshrouded in a controversy
unrelated to himself.

The previous nuncio, Archbishop Sacconi, had

long ceased to be an effective diplomat in the eyes of the French
court.

As early as 1859, both Rome and Paris had agreed on replac-

ing him, and Pius IX promised to give Sacconi a Red Hat and with i.t
automatic promotion and removal to Rome.

The naming of Chi.gi was

suggested by the French ambassador in Munich, Baron de Menneval.
The Imperial government found the nomination acceptable, but the
arrival of Chigi could not be effected until the next consistory.
until September of 1861 was Sacconi raised to the cardinalate.

Not
Chigi's

appointment was formally announced, and he arrived in Paris to as sume his post in January of 1862.

He was now 51 years old.

6

The first official dispatch which Chigi sent to Rome was dated
January 18, 1862.

It simply i~formed Secretary of State Giacomo

Cardinal Antonelli (1806-1876) that the journey from Rome by way of
Marseilles and Lyons had been successful and that ecclesiastical
receptions }iad been held at a number of stops.

Although Chigi. had

been in Paris less than a week, he had already met with Cardinal
Morlot (Archbishop of Paris), the Foreign Minister Edouard-Antoine
Thouvenel, and a number of French politicians.

For the next several

days, the new nuncio was greeted by other members of the Paris

6Maurain, p. 437.
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Diplomatic Corps of which he was now dean.

7

These first meetings rendered Chigi great satisfaction,

He

found from discussion with the Spanish and Austrian ambassadors that
they thought that the stability of the Kingdom of Italy was limited,
that things could not remain as they were in the peninsula, but that
there was room for direct contacts between Victor Emmanuel and
Pius IX.

The diplomats also felt that there should be some reform in

papal government whereby the pope should delegate his civil powers
to laymen while leaving himself freer to be a spiritual ruler.

8

The members of the Senate and Legislative Assembly, Chigi
wrote to Antonelli, were men "worthy of faith.

11

Many speeches they

gave reiterated the necessity of the Temporal Power and how "inadmissable were the prententions Piedmont on Rome.

11

In every case,

7 Archivio Segreto VaticanQ, Inventario della Segre ta ria di
Stato, Rubricella #287 (1862). A rubricella is a day book in which
we re recorded capsule summaries of all dispatches as they arrived
from the vai-ious nunciatures. Use of these day books has proved
largely sufficient for this first chapter.
The Vatican Archives are cited hereinafter as ASV, the Secretary of State's section as Segr di St.
~

8

Rapporto #15, Feb. 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1862,
Rubrica 165, fascolo 21, fol. 80. A rapporto is an official di.spatch
from a nuncio to the s-cretary of state in Rome. Citation of
Chigh 's rapporti forms the bulk of Vatican documents used in this
work. Chigi wrote a total of 2131 dispatches during his twelve years
at Paris.
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such sentiments reflected the thinking and polity of the Emperor him self.

9
Thouvenel was more cautious, indicating that although the

Emperor had a desire to put an end to the present state of affairs in
Italy and as devoted as the Emperor was to the Holy Father, there
was a need for reconciliation between the interests of Italy and those
of the Holy See.

The annexations by Piedmont must be regarded as

faits accomplis, and it was useless to think that France would resort
to force to regain Papal territory already lost.

Chigi drew some

hope from Thouvenel's promise, given at the end of the interview,
that the French troops would not leave Rome.

10

The first meeting between Chigi. and the Emperor was set for
January 23 at the Tuileries.

The occasion was the presentation of

credentials, and it was much played up by Napoleon.
was pr,esent as well as most of the Diplomatic Corps.

The full court
The Emperor

gave the new nuncio a special guard of honor and the use of a carriage

9 1bid., fols. 77-78. Important to note here is Chigiis reference to "Piedmont'' rather than "Italy. 11 Si.nee the Holy See did not
officially recognize the existence of the Kingdom of Italy until 192 9,
almost all of its official reference during.the nineteenth century to
the major political state in the Italian peninsula was in terms of
"Piedmont" or (until 1870) 11 the government of Florence .. , Thi.s
careful distinction was scrupulously adhered to by Chigi., as is seen
throughout this work.
lOibid., fols. 78-79.
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from the Imperial stables.
In presenting his credentials, Archbishop Chigi alluded to the
honor he felt in being named to this "noble and generous nation''
which has proven itself to be "very Christian.

11

He hoped that he

would employ all his zeal "to maintain the good rapport which happily
exists between the Holy See and the French government.

11

In his

reply, Napoleon said he had no doubts that Chigi's appointment would
improve relations between himself and Rome and ''would serve the
well-being of Religion and the peace of Christianity. "
After this exchange, Chigi was accorded the privilege of being
presented to Empress Eugenie who had waited in her own apartments
during the official ceremonies.

All in all, Chigi wrote to Antonelli,

there certainly seemed to be a great deal of support, both official
and popular, for the cause of tlfe B:oly Father.

11

On February 3, 1862, Chigi was a dinner guest of the Emperor.
Afterwards, Napoleon and the nuncio had a discussion on matters
pertinent to,.. the Roman Question.

Napoleon again indicated how grate -

11 Le Moniteur Universal, January 24, 1862, p. 99, for the
description of the presentation ceremony.
Chigi's remark about the
extent of support in France for the cause of the Holy Father is from
ASV, Se gr di St, Rubricella #287 ( 1862).
On the average, Chigi met with Napoleon III about twice a
year. These meetings were in addition to the annual formality of
the New Year's greetings from the Diplomatic Corps which Chigi
delivered in his capacity as dean.
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ful he was to the Holy Father for having appointed a nuncio and for
thus having normalized relations between Paris and Rome.
he hoped to see the present disputes in Italy settled.

One day

Matters were

going in a vicious circle in the peninsula, and such things as the con tinual rebellion in Naples and Sicily would lead one to think that Italian
unity was a "chimera."

The activities of both the left-wing Gari-

baldians and the plots of the deposed conservative King of Naples
lthen residing in Rome under Pius IX's protectioill showed how difficult Napoleon 1 s situation was as he found both solutions inimical,

12

If disorder and violence were to continue in Italy, the Em-

peror continued, France had a firm intention of searching for a means
of aiding the Holy Father, but she would have to be obliged to exclude
every project which would have the use of force as a base.

Italy

#

must suffer for her own good.

"It is not so bad that the Italians

undergo this experience in their alleged greatness.

Their misfortune

displeases me, but I hope that it will be salutary, for such is always
the better means to avoid self-deceit.
and events will justify me,"

Let us wait a while longer,

Napoleon concluded the conversation

with another affirmation that French troops would not retreat from
Rome.

13

12

Rapp 15, February 9, 1862, ASV, Segr di St, A 1862, R
165, fols. 81-82.
13 Ibid., fols. 83-84.

-13-

S .ich was to be the style of most of Chigi 1 s reports in the
1

years 1862 to 1869: attention to all nuances of the Roman Question,
whether in the Diplomatic Corps, the government and cabinet, the
French press and literature, the episcopate, or the Emperor himself.
Any embassy or nunciature serves its home government as a
listening post to report events and evaluate policies of various nations.
The Paris nunciature under Flavio Chigi was to be no exception.
Chigi's dispatches from the first seven years were constantly filled
with as much information as he could gather on significant diplomatic
issues even if they were not of direct interest to the Vatican.
For example, in 1863 Chigi furnished considerable background
on the Polish uprising.

The Catholic religion of the Poles concerned

Rome, and Paris was a major source for data and developments.
Chigi continually adjudged the shuation and imparted all details of
negotiations of the powers over the affair.

Discussion of Polish

matters entered into many of the conversations Chigi held with Thouvenel that

y~ar.

Chigi sought to keep the Holy See's views and posi-

tion known to the powers by direct contact with the various am bas sadors. _ The Vatican displayed this attention, not only because of
the Catholicism of the Poles, but also because of an underlying fear
that any diplomatic arrangements France might make elsewhere on
the continent would undermine the strength of the French commitment

-14-

in Rorne.

14

In 1864 a similar pattern of behavior emerged regarding the
Danish War.

Once again, Chi.gi. filled the di.plomati.c pouches to

Rome with note after note on the north European conflict,

The Vati.-

can's concern here would seem more tenuous than in the Poli.sh case,
yet one Catholic power (Austria) was involved and another Catholic
power (France) was at close range, wondering whether to intervene.
France 1 s foreign policy was almost as important to the Holy See as
its own.

15

The Napoleonic intervention in Mexico also interested Chi.gi..
He reported on the selection of Maximilian of

~ustria

as Emperor,

his vi.sit to Paris and departure for Mexico, the di.ffi.culty between
France and the United States, and the subsequent French disengage ment from the area.

Church-State relations i.n Mexico were i.n a

condition of tumult at the time, and Chigi. formed his part of the link
of i.nformati.on to Rome.

The nuncio even met wi.th the Empress

Carlota in 4-ugust of 1866 when she came through Paris on her unsuc cessful journey of European capitals.
her.

Chigi was of little help to

16

14
ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella # 294 (1863).
15

ASV, Segr di St, Rubri.cella # 301 (1864).

16ASV, Segr di St, Rubri.cella # 287 (1862), # 294 (1863),
# 301 (1864), # 308 (1865), and# 315 (1866).
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The events of the 1860's which did directly concern the Vatican
and its efforts to retain the Temporal Power we re the September Convention, the 1866 war between Austria and Prussia, and the 1867
invasion of the Papal States by the Garibaldians.
The September Convention of 1864 appeared as a complete surprise to Chigi, as it did to many.

The agreement calling for evacua-

tion of French troops from Rome while supposedly leaving the inde pendence of the Papal States under the protection of the Kingdom of
Italy was another aspect of Napoleon III's secret diplomacy.

Chigi's

first dispatch on the pact did not go to Rome until after the announce ment, and there is no indication of any previous knowledge on Chigi 's
part of the negotiations leading to the pact.

From late September to

the end of 1864, Chigi met repeatedly with the Foreign Minister
Edmond Drouyn de Lhuys and wlth the Spanish, Austrian, and Prus sian ambassadors.

His intent was to find the exact French position.

He tried to pry information out of the Italian ambassador in Paris,
ConstantinorNigra, with whom he rarely dealt, all to no avail.
final weapon was a direct appeal to the Emperor.
November, 1864.

This came in early

Chigi met with both Napoleon and the clerical Em-

press Eugenie, but he described this session as "useless.

1117

The 1866 war brought out the worst of nightmares to the

17

The

ASV, Se gr di St, Rubricella

#

301 ( 1864).
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Vatican due to the defeat of Catholic Austria, the cession of VenP.ti.a
to Italy, and the uncertainty as to whether France would enter the
conflict.

Chigi. conducted himself as he had done in the Dani.sh War

two years earlier.

He kept a close watch on all developments and

dutifully reported them to Rome.

His main pre-occupation was, as

before, to ascertain where the French stood.
Because the September Convention was now in force (it had
been agreed on two years earlier and there was no French expediti.onary force at Rome while Italy was at war) and because the Vatican
was diametrically opposed to the smallest changes in the Italian peninsula, much less at the expense of Austria, the cession of Veneti.a
through French hands was a deeply felt blow.

Chi.gi was upset at the

French role despite the fact that Drouyn de Lhuys had made assur11

ances of the

si.ncere neutrali.tf" of France.

The French move was

.
taken as a double act of betrayal- -to Austria and to the Papacy,
Chigi was pleased to report that Vienna resisted all suggestions to
.
18
ce d e t h e T rentlno.
r
The 1867 invasion of the Papal States by Garibaldi brought the
Roman Question out into the open more than it had been since the
wars of Italian Unification.

On his own, Garibaldi led a military

force of volunteers from !tali.an soil across the papal frontier to

18

ASV, Segr di. St, Rubricella # 315 (1866).
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liberate Rome but was stopped by a combined French and Papal army
at Mentana.

Chigi hardly had to furnish Rome with information in

this particular event.
o~

He did give what advanced knowledge he had

the formation of the Garibaldi.an forces.

Because of fears of action

by these radicals, Chigi. was prompted as early as April of 1867 to
request a renewed guarantee of the Temporal Power from the French.
During the actual days of the crisis {October and November, 1867),
Chi.gi. held several conferences with Drouyn de Lhuys and two with
Napoleon III.

The results were much better than what had been ob-

tained after the September Convention and Austro-Prussian War as a
French army garrison remained permanently at Rome after the battle
of Mentana.

19

The years 1868 and 1869 were relatively quiet ones for Chigi.
No great international outbreakt loomed, no qualifications of French
policy towards Rome seemed i.n the offing, the tenor of Europe was
largely peaceful.

Chigi 1s attention was for the most part turned to-

ward internal French politics and the preparations for the upcoming
r

ecumenical council.
French archival sources are rather sparse on Flavio Chigi.
No current personnel reports exist in the French Foreign Ministry
Archives, no year-by-year file or resumes were kept,

l 9ASV, Seg dr St, Rubricella # 322 (186 7).

The archives

-18~

of the Ministry of Cults are somewhat more ample but still limited in
quantity.

The official French view of the nuncio seems to have been

one of some forebearance interspersed with periodic irritation as on
several significant occasions in the 1860 1 s Chigi acted beyond the
limits of his capacity as ambassador in the opinion of the government.
These several occasions involved times when Chigi communicated
directly with French bishops and diocesan officials much to the dis tress of the French cabinet.
In the spring of 1864, the bishop of Nice, Monsignor Sola, was
entangled in a conflict with his cathedral chapter of canons.

Prior

to 1861, Nice had been a part of the Kingdom of Piedmont, but after
France abs orbed the city that year, the diocese was in a state which
had a concordat with Rome.
of the chapter who were

Sola wanted to dismiss some members

politic~lly

opposed to him, and he did so,

claiming that' their appointments were illegal according to the Concordat of 1801 because they had not been formally approved by the
French government.

20

r

Underlying this was the fact that Sola had previously enjoyed
good standing with the government of Piedmont which was now the

20

Maurain, pp. 699-702.
This narration is largely taken
from Maurain.
This author saw some of the same documents
Maura in did in the Archives Nationales in Paris and at the AM.AE.
Certain documents beyond those which Maura in used are cited ac cordingly.
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perfidious state of Italy in the Vatican's eyes.

The canons had been

thrust. upon Sola by an angry Holy See, and he used the pretext of the
lack of government sanction to dislodge the obstreperous cle ri.cs.
The French government supported the bishop while the canons appealed to Rome.
At this juncture, Chigi entered the fray and incurred reproach
from the French cabinet.

On May 19, 1864, Chigi addressed a letter

to the canons saying that the pope had ordered him to inform them
that the pontiff had heard their plea.

Chigi further said, ·"His Holl -

ness encourages the capitulatory corps to hold firm in order that the
present statute not be changed except with the agreement of the proper
authority."

Chigi hoped that the canons would find encouragement in

hearing these thoughts of the Holy Father.

21

French ire was arousedlbecause of the definite stand taken by
the Holy See and because the nuncio had been the transmitter of the
note.

According to the government's position, Chigi. had erred

notoriously,.and gravely.

Paris considered it an uncalled-for inter-

vention in internal affairs by a foreign agent, and the reaction of the

21

The letter in its entirety is found i.n a note from Baroche to
Drouyn de Lhuys, July 12, 1864, Archives Nati.onales, Fonds du Mini.st~re des Cults et Justice, Fl 9 1924. The italicization of the words
"to hold firm" is in the Ba roche note, and the re is no indica ti.on
whether the emphasis was made by Baroche or was in Chi.gi.'s ori.gi.naL
Portions of the letter are also reproduced in Maurain, p, 700,
Archives Nationales hereafter cited as AN.
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cabinet was swift.

The Minister of Cults and Justice, Pierre-Jules

Baroche, fired a note o_f protest to the Quai d'Orsay in which he succintly stated a phrase which would be repeated often, "Le nonce
n 'est qu 'un ambassadeur.

11

Baroche cited earlier instances when

previous nuncios had to be reminded of this (notably 1802, 1823,
1852) and both the nuncio and the Holy See had reneged.

22

The French ambassador in Rome, the Comte de Sartiges,
carried a note of protest to Cardinal AntoneUi.

Antonelli replied by

defending the right of the pope to use nuncios to communicate with
the clergy, otherwise there would be little use to having nuncios at
European courts.

The normal procedure was for a nuncio to send a

copy of such correspondence to the government beforehand. Antonelli merely expressed regret that such an action had not occurred in
this particular instance.

,

The Nice affair was basically centered in this exchange of
notes and other actions from May to August of 1864, capped by
Antonelli 's )lalf-apology and admission of irregularity.

The Quai

d'Orsay and the Ministry of Cults continued for the next several
months to keep a close eye on events at Nice and on Chigi.

The con-

frontation did not set an ideal mood for the coming of the September

22

Baroche to Drouyn de Lhuys, AN, loc. cit.
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Convention that same year.

23

Only a few more months elapsed when Chigi. committed another
error of judgment in the matter of corresponding with the French
Episcopat.

In the wake of the encyclical Quanta Cura of December 8,

1864 and the famous appended Syllabus Errorum, the reaction of the
French clergy produced some forthright statements.

Two of the

more renowned ones were issued by the bishop of Poi.tiers, Louis
Pie, who defended the encyclical in a widely·:.publici.zed sermon, and
the bishop of Orleans, Felix Dupanloup, who skillfully interpreted
the Syllabus in a manner which toned down the conservative views of
Pius IX.

Chigi created strife similar to the Nice affair by writing

letters of congratulation to both of these prelates early in 1865,
These letters were published by Le Monde in early February, prob-

,

ably through no fault of Chigi 's.

, In his letter to Pie (January 12, 1865), Chigi indicated that

he had received "with joy" Pie's pulpit statement.
"The

verit~le

He further wrote,

glory of the Church of France would be resplendent

without shadow on this occasion. . . . It would be such a consolation

23 AMAE, Memoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, subtitled "Immixtion des nonces dans les affaires ecclesiastiques de
France, 1864," contains over 200 pages of notes and documents on
the Nice controversy. A complete analysis of these papers is unnecessary here because of space limitations and because of the
adequate treatment to be found in Maura in.
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to the Holy Father how this Catholic Nation would be inspired in its
courage and firmness from which, despite diverse opinions which
may appear, it does not waver.

11

Writing to Dupanloup on January 26, Chigi was hardly less
complimentary.
ficent work,

11

In referring to Dupanloup's pamphlet as a 1'magni-

Chigi wrote,

11

I cannot finish without expressing to you

all my recognition for this new testimony in whi.ch you have given the
Church and the Holy See of your zeal and devotion and for the powerful backing which you bring forth again, so helpful to the cause of the
Holy Father.

11

24

The text and tone of these letters, supporting as they did two
bishops who had been so outspoken in an area of controversy of acute
embarrassment to the civil power, represented for the French gov:..

'

ernment another instance in which the nuncio interfered in France's
interna1 affairs.

Baroche noted, as he had earlier in the Nice case,

that the published letters ''constituted an infraction of the rules of
internationa! law and the public right of France. 1125
Sartiges was ordered to lodge another protest.

Antonelli had

little choice in the matter other than to order a full apology by Chigi.
Chigi was given an audience by Napoleon III on February 14, 1865 at

24
Undated memo from Baroche quoting the letters, AN,
19
F
1924.
25

Ibid.
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which he expressed atonement for the publicity and assured the Em peror that "penetrated with the duties of his diplomatic standing, he
never had any intention of straying from the rules of international
law.

11

The Moniteur simply noted that the Emperor accepted the

26
apology "with benevolence. "
An undated memo emanating from the Ministry of Cults about
this time stated much of the French position on the place and bounds
of a nuncio.

The memo largely refers to Chigi 's practice of writing

to bishops notifying them of transfer.

Beyond scorning this parti-

cular device as being contrary to the principles of international la\t;,
the memo further stated,

11

•••

the Emperor and his Government

have never admitted and cannot admit that the Nuncio of the Holy

26

Le Moniteur, Februat-y 15, 1865, p. 145 and Maurain,
pp. 720-22.
Chigi, of course, did correspond with the French
episcopate on occasions other than the Nice affair and the Syllabus
letters.
Examples of his correspondence can be found in the following: papers of Cardinal Donnet, Archbishop of Bourdeaux, AN,
160 AP, d. 3; Bishop Dupanloup's papers, AN, AB XIX 526, d. l;
M. Lagran_ge, Vie de Mgr. Dupanloup, eveque d 1 0rleans (Paris,
1883-84), Vol. II, pp. 471-473; M. Paguelle de Folenay, Vie du
Cardinal Guibert (Paris, 1896}, Vol. II, p. 347; and Louis Baunard,
Histoire du Cardinal Pie (Paris, 1886), Vol. II, p. 224.
In light of the fact of the existence of these and presumably
other letters of Chigi to French bishops, the irritation by the
French government in 1864 and 1865 is difficult to understand.
Evidently, it was the publicity which prompted the o·~trage of the
cabinet.
At the Vatican Archives, the author was informed that the
whereabouts of Chigi 1 s personal papers (other than the official correspondence with Antonelli} is unknown.

-24-

Father may correspond directly with bishops.

This principle has

. . . been explicitly recognized by the court of Rome on numerous
occasions, some of them very recent."

The note went on to say that

in writing to bishops, the nuncio committed acts of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction which had always been forbidden for a nuncio to do in
France.

"It is here again that the Government of the Emperor is

obliged to put forth an absolute protest at this pretension.

11

Further along, referring again to the· "pretensions of the
Nunciature,

11

the memo said that Rome and the Nuncio should re-

member a decree from an earlier pope (Urban VIII} that in cases of
transferred bishops, only the Roman Curia or ''some other means''
should be used to send such a notice.

The French government had

historically been "the other means" by which all papal correspondence had been transmitted. Tht! memo concluded that the government
should declare again that it would no longer tolerate direct corres'

pondence between the Nuncio and the bishops.

27

There were to be several more instances of Chigi's conduct
r

before 1870 which would compromise him in front of the cabinet.

In

1866, he wrote to the cathedral chapters of Marseilles and Vannes,
instructing them to proceed with a canonical election upon the resig-

27

19
AN, F
1947. The memo is in a subsection of this carton
entitled: ''Rapports de la France avec Rome sous le Second Empire
et la T rois i~me Republi.que. 11
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nation of the previous ordinary.

In 1863 and 1867, the Minister of

Cults turned down requests by provincial bi.shops that Chi.gi. be allowed
to participate in local religious observances.

Baroche deni.ed the

requests, indicating that the nuncio could not be allowed to attend such
functions where his mere presence and seniority would allow him to
preside over the services.

28

In early 1869, the French government took exception to letters
of some Ultramontane clergy in France on tne upcoming council which

' Cattolica.
were published in Rome in the Jesuit organ, Ci.vilta

The

government thought the publication improper since the letters had
passed through the Paris nunci.ature.

The French were further dis -

turbed by the pro-infallibility nature of the letters.

Chigi castigated

the government for itself interfering in the Holy See's matters.

29

,

Drouyn de Lhuys was prompted at one point to remark to
Baroche that although Rome was always disposed to admit "in pri.nciple 1 ' that the nuncio accredited in France 'was only an ambassador, " the ¥atican always evaded the issue when a question of a
violation came up.

2

30

9Maurain, pp. 896-899.

30

Drouyn de Lhuys to Baroche, February 15, 1966, F

19

1924.
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All this did little to make relations between the Second Empire and the Holy See harmonious.

It is well-established that such

things as the September Convention, the S_yllabus, the mistrust be tween Pius IX and Napoleon III, the Emperor's chameleon views on
the Roman Question, and the Ultramontane-Liberal split in the ranks
of French Catholics were definite signs of Franco-Vatican discord.
It is safe to say that the conduct of the papal nuncio in Paris during
the same period was of no help and probably" did more harm than
good.
As the decade of the 1860 1 s closed, the Vatican Council opened.

In France, some of the Emperor's "liberal" reforms were imminent.
The immediate prospects for understanding between Paris and Rome
were dim,

Only a few more months remained in which to re-estabI

lish cordiality before the skies would collapse in the summer of 1870,

CHAPTER II

IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE SECOND EMPIRE
JANUARY TO JULY, 1870

The last six months of the life of the Second Empire are often
described as its last spring.

Internal economic growth was never

greater, the social issues were dormant, the liberal reforms began
to take hold, the foreign scene boded peace.

The Papacy was enjoy-

ing similar strength despite the discord often seen in the sessions of
the ecumenical council.

Pius IX was popular as never before, there

was an overwhelming infallibilist majority in the council, the Tern-

"

poral Power was secure with the continued presence of French troops
and the seeming weakness of Italy, and the rush toward the proclam ation of infallibility was itself a sign of ultimate triumph.

The

iss.ues and ~uties which faced Flavia Chigi from January to July of
1870 reflected this optimistic outlook, as he shared in the successes
experienced by Paris and Rome.

With the exception of an abortive

French attempt to intervene in the council, the situation was encouraging.
The year 1870 opened with the annual New Year's reception
at the Tuileries in which the Diplomatic Corps took part.
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Chigi, as
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Dean of the Corps, delivered the official greeting to Napoleon III as he
had done each January I since 1863.

In his remarks, Chigi gave the

traditional New Year's message of the assembled corps, making
particular reference to the ambassadors' hopes for the health of the
Emperor, Empress, and Prince Imperial and for the prosperity of
France.

Napoleon's formal response indicated his hope for good re la -

tions between hi.s government and foreign powers in the new year.

1

The Emperor made a personal aside to Chigi, entrusting him
to pass on to the Holy Father his profound homage.

Napoleon regret-

ted that his own state of ill-health and the work of the council facing
the Pope had prevented the two from maintaining better contact.

The

Prince Imperial likewise approached Chigi at the reception and re quested that the nuncio lay before the Holy Father his peaceful wishes
.
2
an d d evotion.

The next day saw the announcement of the new Ollivier Minis try, the so-called cabinet of the 2nd of January.

1
2

The new ministry

Journal Offi.ciel, January 2, 1870, p. 5.

Rapp 1527, January 4, 1870, ASV, Segr di St. Archi.vi.o di
Nunziatura di. Pari.gi (hereafter ANP). This report was found in
the archives of the nunciature now on file at the Vatican.
The files
of the various nunciatures are systematically recalled to Rome,
Unfortunately, these particular bundles of documents are not paginated as the R ubrice are.
Reports not found in the Secretary of
1
State s file can usually be found in rough draft in the nuncia tu re a rch i.ves.
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was to embody the latest step of Napoleon III's continuing libe raliza ti on as it was intended to be a true, functioning cabinet.

Chigi saw

in the formation of this new ministry the intent and hope of the Em peror to establish. a "vital 11 government, one balanced betwee::1 Center
and Center -Right which would enhance the imperial authority and one
which would create a counterbalance against the Orleanists and other
elements.

Chigi thought that all political elements which could pre -

vail against such a combination as the Ollivier cabinet were all in
motion but that such a design of opposition would not have any proba bility of succeeding.
The men to be found in the ministry were very acceptable to
Chigi.

Louis Buffet at Finances, Lou vet in Agriculture and Com -

merce, the Marquis de Thalouet at Public Works, rand the new Presi.,.
dent of the Conseil d 'Etat, Marie-Louis Parieu, all n~d reputations
as fervent and practicing Catholics.

The Comte Daru, Minister of

Foreign Affairs, and Emile Segris, Minister of Public Instruction,
were "decisively infused for the cause of the Church."

Two other

members of the ministry, Emile Ollivier, Keeper of the Seals, and
Maurice Richard, Minister of Fine Arts, were Protestants but Chigi
thought them well-disposed toward the Catholic religion.

"It is

false to assume," Chigiwrote to Antonelli, "that Ollivier is so
ravished with errors concerning the two most important points, the
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Temporal Power and the rapport between Church and State.

113

Antonelli 's reaction was that Chigi 's report, along with other
information about these men he had received from France and else 1

where,

1bad given hope that the interests of the Church and of the

Temporal Power of the Holy Father will find in the new ministry a
new means of support and • . . perhaps an effective defense.

!I

Antonelli. also told Chigi that the nunci.o 1 s communication conformed
to his own judgment of the men in power.

Rome evidently felt re -

assured that Napoleon III's continued liberalization and appointing of
non-Catholics to important positions did not appear to threaten French
policy toward Rome.

4

Chi.gi quickly learned to adapt himself to dealing \Vi.th the new
liberal system.

Antonelli had ordered him to seek an interview with

Daru to obtain the 'Emperor's final agreement to some nominees to
vacant sees.

Chigi's first impulse was to request an audience with

both Daru and Napoleon, thinking that the Emperor would wish to be
directly consulted.

Chigi found out very quickly that this procedure

was now mistaken.

He was quickly informed that he need meet only

with the Foreign Minister as under the liberal reforms the new ministers had far more authority than previously.

3

"Such diligence,"

Ibid.

4Antonelli to Chigi, #57565, January 10, 1870, loc. cit,
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he wrote,

·ir have

believed to be more opportune, indeed even neces-

sary, because I know posi.tively that in all deliberations which concern
public affairs, the minister deals with them categorically.
i.ng to the new system, the operation of parliamentary rule,

Accordo

••

all

the participants [in a cabinet meeting] deal with the Emperor minis terially and His Majesty seems merely to preside. 115
An early test for the Ollivier Ministry was the shooting of the
republican Victor Noi.r by the infamous Pierre Bonaparte, a disgraced
cousin of the Emperor.

The possibility of turni.ng Noi.r's funeral

into an anti-government demonstration was thwarted by Ollivier's
famous quotation on threatening to use force to break up any such
demonstration yet affirming that his government was one of peace
and order.

Chigi wrote in glowing terms to Antonelli. on January 18

of his admiration for the government and how it handled the situa tion.

The government's action showed it possessed "all the con-

di.ti.ons of a great vitality and a splendid success.''

The ministry

was now viewed by public opinion on all sides as having "dignity,
force, capacity undiminished.''
Olli.vier's leadership.

All factions were now rallied around

6

5 Rapp 1530, January 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R
248, f 2, fol. 5.
6 Rapp 1535, January 18, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R
248, f 1, fol. 9.
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In early February, a strike by workers at the Le Creusot

steelworks in Paris was broken up by use of troops, the first such
instance in France since the 1850 1 s.

Chigi made reference to how

the workers were tightly organized and how there were revolutionary
elements among them.

He praised the troops for the restraint

shown, how they reacted only when acted upon, and the fact that the re
were no deaths and only minimal wounds.

However, he thought that

the Ollivier ministry was setting a dangerous precedent for itself,
that it could perhaps reap what it has sown.

An important lesson for

Rome was that Olliver had indicated that he could well follow the same
course of action if the papal government was threatened by simi.lar

.

revolut10nary outbreaks.

7

The sessions of the Vatican Council had been underv::ay since
December 8, 1869; but the proceedings at Rome had little occupied
Chigi's attention during the first part of 1870.

The French govern-

ment had likewise given little heed to the sessions.

Upon taking office,

Daru had in a Senate speech disclaimed any interest on the part of the
Foreign Ministry and had thus re -affirmed the hands -off policy enunciated by his predecessor La Tour d'Aubergne the previous September.
Until late February, Chigi 1 s correspondence mentioned little about

7 Rapp 1549, February 11, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870,
R 243, f 3, fols. 54-55.
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the council debates, the issues under discussion, or the heated arguments .on voting procedure then underway.
A succinct change in this situation began to appear after the
text of the scheme de Ecclesia was furtively published by the Augs burger Zeitung i.n late January, 1870.

The schema contained the

controversial statement on papal infallibility.

It further contained a

number of sections pertai.ni.ng to relations between Church and State,
one of which read, "If anyone says that the Church is not a perfect
society . . . or that, in the civil society or in the state, it is subject
to secular control, let him be anathema. "

There we re other portions

asserting the Church's right to own property, control education, and
to decide whether the civil power was acting correctly in a moral
sense.

It was this section which aroused the fears of several Euro-

pean civil governments, France in particular, and which produced a
mild attempt by Daru to effect some sort of intervention in the council sessions.

8

Other European states, Austria and Prussia especially, were
to be brought into the affair with the French and through their own
representatives in Rome.

The diplomatic involutions seen in this

study need not occupy us here.

8

As it turned out, the French action

Lillian Parker Wallace, The Papacy and Eu
macy, 1869-78 (Chapel Hill., 1948), pp. 72-73 and 7
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was largely unilateral due to the deference shown France by the other
powers and because of the lack of substance in Daru's maneuvers.
Chigi. naturally became a part of the exchanges between Paris and
Rome.

He managed to present the Vatican's case in a very deter-

mined way, but the eventual failure of the French efforts cannot be
attributed to Chigi alone.
Daru 's first move came on February 20 when he sent a dis patch for Antonelli to the Marquis de Banneville, French ambassador
in Rome. expressing strong objection to the wording of the schema
on Church-State relations.

Daru focused his arguments on this por-

tion of de Ecclesia only, offering no comment on the dogma of infallibil ity. which he said was entirely a religious matter.

In a cabinet

meeting on February 21, Daru came face to face with strenuous opposition from other ministers for his action, and he was forced to
telegraph Benneville to hold back the dispatch from Antonelli until the
wording could be toned down.

9

On February 22, Chigi sent word to

Antonelli that he had caught wind of a

"new impression" in the

government concerning what was happening at Rome.

There was a

great worry as to what would happen to ci.vi.1 society if conciliar

9 wallace, pp. 83 -84. The full text of Daru 1 s note can be found
in Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Concili.orum Recenti.orurn, Collectio
Lacensis (Rome and Fribourg, 18 90), Vol. VII, pp. 1553 -1555. The
note is in a secti.on devoted to documents between Rome and the various governments of Europe on matters related to the council.
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sanction of the schema was forthcomi.ng, and the government, as far
as Chi.gi was able to determine, was definitely going to make some
move.

Chigi was further aware of the difficulty Daru was having with

the cabi.net, but the main fear was that the troops would be withdrawn
from Rome i.f the schema were adopted.

10

Chigi was able to see Daru about the matter on March 6.
was rather cooperative.

Daru

He admitted that messages had been sent to

Banneville about French objections to the council, and he showed
Chigi some of the letters and papers involved.

He expressed his

conviction that the ideas contained in the schema would amount to
tearing up the Concordat.

As far as removing the French garrison

was concerned, Daru said he realized how such an action would only
strengthen the cause of the Left in France and he would rather turn
in his resignation than have any part of withdrawing from Rome.
Daru then brought up the matter of whether the pope would ad:r.:lit a
French ambassador to the council sessions.

The dispatch of Feb-

ruary 20 had not mentioned this idea as it had contained only the protests against de Ecclesia, but Daru had made the suggestion of an
ambassador in notes to other civil powers.

Only by the time of this

conference with Chigi was the matter brought before a papal repre -

10

Rapp 1554, February 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870,
R 165, f 3, fols. 88-89.
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sentative.

Chigi and Daru simply went over possible candidates for

the position (namely Banneville, Parieu, and the Due de Broglie),
but nothing was said on the legitimacy of admitting an ambassador of
a civil power to a church counci.1.

In his report, Chigi made no com-

ment on Da ru' s request or on the candidates suggested.

11

Antonelli' s response to Chigi 's report was couched in no un certain terms.

He spoke of what he called "the strange interpreta-

tions attached to this document [de Ecclesia]

11

saying that they were

none other than the product of unjust ideas on the nature of the Church."
He considered it a false concept to say that the rights of the Church
impinged upon the civil power.

He promised that his upcoming state -

ment would set things clear as to the meaning of the articles in the
schema and would "serve to undeceive the honorable Comte Darci in
his ill-conceived convictions that the schema would tend to tear up
the Concordat. . • .

The conclusions of the council . . . will never

have as an effect the abolition of the Concordat."

Antonelli refrained

from making any direct reference to the Daru note of February 20 or
to the ambassador's proposal.

11

12

Rapp 1566, March 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869=

70.
12

Antonelli to Chigi, #58260, March 18, 1870, loc. cit.
There is difficulty experienced in analyzing diplomatic documents
and trying to maintain proper chronology because of the ti.me lag
involved in transmitting notes between emissary and foreign minis -
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In mid-March, Baron Karl de Werther, Prussian ambassador

m Paris, told Chigi that Count Otto von Bismarck was thinking of
responding in a positive way to the French proposal for common
action against the council.

Chigi told Antonelli about this but coun-

tered the development by saying that talk in the Diplomatic Corps at
Paris was that religious questions should be kept apart from political
ones.

The re was hesitation by both Catholic and Protestant powers

to interfere in any way in the council, and, despite what Werther had
said, the mood Chigi read was that deference was going to
to France's initiatives.

13

~e

given

Antonelli wrote back that the proposal of

which Werther had spoken had been definitely refused.

He further

try.
By the time an ambassador, or in this case a nuncio has sent
something to his chief and received a response, several days have
elapsed.
Important other events may have occurred in the meantime.
In the Chigi-Antonelli correspondence, there was a variance
of four to nine days from the date of a Chigi rapporto to the date of
a direct response by Antonelli.
Then it would be several more
days until Secretary of State's answer would be delivered to Chigi.
Telegraph was, of course, used in emergency situations, and these
are so noted,
There is no way of telling how often Antonelli \vas
able to answer the same day he received something from ChigL
Since the focus of this paper is Chigi and his view of things
in Paris rather than Antonelli and how things looked from Rome,
the emphasis is laid upon how all this transmission appeared in
Paris. The reader is advised not to pay much attention to the dates
of some of Antonelli is statements, no matter how late they may
seem.

13

Rapp 1575, March 21" 1870, loc. cit,
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enjoined Chigi to discourage the talk of concerted action and of the
more frequently heard proposal of a French ambassador to the council.

14
Antonelli's most forthright statement on the French note of

February 20 came on March 19 and was presented to Daru on March
26.

Antonelli opened by assuring that the Holy Father was as a pp re -

dative as ever for the protection afforded by France for the freedom
of the council.

The Holy See further understood that Daru's interest

was prompted by sincere and devoted sentiments on his part,

Anton-

elli said he could not see how de Ecclesia had caused such a change
of viewpoint in the French cabinet.

He took special pains to declare

that the objectionable section of the schema did not give the Church
or the Roman Pontiff absolute power over the civil authority. although there was certainly something to be said of the superiority of
the spiritual over the temporal on all levels.

The Church is a per-

feet society, said Antonelli, and it is the one to decide what shall
be rendered unto Caesar and what shall be rendered unto God.
The principles as enunciated in de Ecclesia, Antonelli continued, had been taught by the Catholic Church for centuries.

The

essential purpose in debating and proclaiming them in the council
was mainly "to recall to modern society the divine precents of jus -

14
Antonelli to Chigi, #58358, March 30, 1870, loc, cit.

-39tice and honesty and to bring again to the world that peace and pros perity which only can be attained by the observance of the divine
law."

The French government, he said, had no reason to intervene

in the deliberations of the council.

Despite Daru 1 s contention, there

was no provision in the Concordat of 1801 allowing the French government to have a representative at any Church council.

The adoption

of de Ecclesia would not in any manner alter the relations between
France and the Holy See and any other civil government.

Antonelli

said he hoped that the French would not continue to insist on ha-dng an
ambassador at the council or on having any say on any council matters.

15
As stated above, Chigi presented this note to Daru on March

26.

Because the meeting was rather short and was part of the weekly

reception given by· the Foreign Minister to the Diplomatic Corps,
Chigi requested a later appointment with Daru to sound him out more
thoroughly.

Daru would have more time to sample the sentiments

of other members of the cabinet.
again until March 31.

Accordingly, the two did not meet

Daru said that the response of Antonelli was

benevolent and deferential in tone but severe and regretful in content

15

Collectio Lac ens is, Vol. VII, pp. 1555-1557. The author
could not find a manuscript copy of this note in either the Vatican
Archives or the Fre11ch Foreign Ministry Archives. A copy appeared in the Memorial Diplomatique, May 7, 1870, pp. 349-350.
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because of the rejection of the ambassador request.

The Foreign

Minister was inclined to modify his position on the ambassador ques tion, but he thought some way remained for the French to continue
pressure and eventually get their ideas before the council.

16

On April 2, Chigi sent notice to Rome of an impending <level-

opment which would effectively end the current maneuvers of Daru.
A project which had long been talked about in French political circles
was about to come to fruition: the idea of holding a plebiscite to submit to national approval all Napoleon III 1 s recent liberal reforms.
Chigi saw two motives in the decision to go for the plebiscite.

First,

the government wanted to see the Imperial dynasty receive a renewed
stamp of approval which a favorable plebiscite would indicate.

The

second motive was that the Imperialist party would be able by such
an act of power and energy to destroy the opinion that it was defunct
and lifeless.

Chigi thought the Imperialists were aiming at the forces

of the Left, especially the Republicans and Orleanists.

16

The question of whether to hold a plebiscite had now reached
cabinet-level discussion.

Although the decision to hold a plebiscite

was likely to be made, there was a split in the cabinet.
obstinate ministers were Buffet at Finances and Daru.

16

The t\•:o
Chigi under-

Rapp 1586, April 2, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248,
f 1, fols. 108-109.
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understood these two to be opposed to holding a plebiscite because
they were more inclined toward Orleanism, and plebiscites did not
enter into a liberal monarchy scheme of government.

Chigi thought

it very likely that a ministerial crisis would result because of the

disagreement and that Daru stood to lose because of his position.

17

Several days later, on April 8, Chigi reported that the government had definitely changed plans from sending an ambassador to the
council to the idea of submitting a memorandum.

This memorandum

would be placed directly before the council thereby insuring that the
French point of view would be communicated to the council participants.

18

On April 12, when the cabinet decided to go ahead with the

plebiscite• Daru promptly resigned along with Buffet.

Chigi was

elated that his prediction of several days earlier had come true.

He

told Antonelli that the departure of Daru did not surprise too many
observe rs, for many had doubted all along that he could re ma in much
longer as Foreign Minister.

Daru 's successor was not immediately

named, and Olliver temporarily assumed the portfolio.

19

17

Rapp 1587, April 3, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248,
f 3, fols. 56-57.
18
19

Rapp 1590, April 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70.

Rapp 1591., April 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248,
f 3, fols. 6 0 -61.
Wallace states that when Daru resigned, "The news was tele graphed to Rome, 'Daru resigns. Ollivier takes his place. Council
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The business of the proposed memorandum remained at hand
despite Daru's departure.

It had by now been drawn up, approved by

the cabinet, and sent on to Banneville who was trying to obtain an
audience with Pius IX to make the formal presentation,

Chigi sus -

pected that Daru still had had collective action by the powers in mind
because he had sent copies of the memorandum to the other governThe Austrians had responded by stating approval of what it

ments.

contained but no moreg and Chigi thought that the remaining cabinets
had made similar answers.

Sentiment for concerted action did not

. .
20
seem to be bu1ldmg.
With Daru's resignation, the main support for French intervention was gone.

The oral backing of the other pO\i.·ers was still to

be had, but within the French cabinet there was no one who would
continue to push the issue.

Consequently, Banneville was left to

present the memorandum without firm advocacy from Paris.

He

was not able to see Antonelli until April 15, and he did not see Pius

IX until a week later.

In this audience, the Pope refused to lay the

memorandum before the council.

21

free.'" ~· cit., p. 98. She does not say who sent this note, and
there is no indication at the Vatican Archives that Chigi sent such a
telegram.

20
21

Rapp 1591, loc. cit.
Wallace, pp. 99-100.
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During this same period, Chigi 1 s reports to Antonelli indic;i te
that the. memora.ndum proposal had ceased to occupy the center of
attention.

Of six reports sent to Rome between April 12 and April

22, not one mentioned anything about the council or the memorandum.
Only by April 21 did Chigi have an opportunity to see Ollivier after
he took over as acting Foreign Minister.

In their conversation,

Chigi and Ollivier centered on renewed felicitations between the Holy
See and France, an understanding that there would be no change in
the status of French troops at Rome, and a pledge by Ollivier to get
to the business of naming bishops once the plebiscite was completed,
There was no talk of the council.

22

In the papal correspondence, Antonelli wrote the last word

on the French inten·ention move in a note to Chigi dated May 7.
Chigi had \Vritten him a week earlier saying that members of the
Diplomatic Corps had been asking him what had happened to the French
memorandum.

The word was out that Banneville had made the pre-

sentation, but a response had not been made public.

Antonelli told

Chigi that the Pope did not find it suitable to give any response as the
memorandum did not contain anything substantially different from
the first French note of February 20.

22

The answer Antonelli gave on

Rapp 1597, April 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R
248, f 3, fols. 62-63.
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March 19 was sufficient.

Antonelli said he was quite content that

Ollivier.had indicated that the memorandum be allowed to lapse without an answer.

The whole d~marche instigated by Daru, tenuous from

the start, evaporated into oblivion.

23

In the early part of May, newspaper accounts circulated con-

cerning alleged plots against the Emperor's life; the Journal Officiel
noted, for example, the arrest of a number of conspirators on May 1,
but played down any danger.

Chigi thought that the publicity would

discourage "the friends of the revolution" from their determination
to take any action.

Ollivier did tell Chigi that the danger was more

real than the newspaper accounts had indicated, but so far, all co::J.spiracy rings had been uncovered.

Chigi thought the government

release of the information was designed to shake some of the indifference off the electorate before the plebiscite.

The ministry was

now more secure than ever in its expectation of the outcome, and it
. 1• 24
.
regarde d the d isc 1osure of the mtrigue
as prov1'd entla

The long-awaited plebiscite was held on May 8.

Chigi was

pleased with the favorable result--a nationwide majority of 7 to l in

23

Rapp 1599, April 29, 1870 and Antonelli to Chigi, May 7,
1870; both in ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70.

24

Rapp 1600, May 3, 1870 and Rapp 1602, May 6, 1870,
ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 68-69 and 72-73. Journal Officiel, May 1, 1870, p. 753.
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favor of the Empire.

He wrote to Ron1e that the government's ex-

pectations were "splendidly justified.

11

One could easily determine

that considerable content and satisfaction had taken hold of the Emperor and the cabinet.

Reports of disorder in Paris and in the other

great cities of France on the day of voting were unconfirmed, but the
fact of the rumors was an indication to Chigi that revolutionary de signs did continue to exist along with the fears that these designs
created.

25

With the end of the Daru council intervention move, the breaking up of the assassination ring, and the finishing of the plebiscite,
Chigi thought it an opportune moment to have an audience with the
Emperor.

He saw both Napoleon and Eugenie on May 13 at the

Tuileries.

Chigi opened by telling Napoleon of the relief Pius IX felt

because of the unc·overing of the plots against the Emperor's life.
discussion on infallibility then followed.

A

Despite all that had been

done and said during the Daru d~marche, Napoleon III was still evidently concerned about the effects adoption of de Ecclesia with its
assertion of Church rights would have on Franco-Vatican relations.
The Empress was likewise concerned about infallibility.

She

spoke in a pronounced manner of her fears that the definition would
bring about the alienization even defection from the faith by many

25

Rapp 1604, May 10, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 74-75.
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Catholics.

Chigi strove to point out that these fears were exaggerated

and were rooted i.n Gallicanism, for which Their Majesties certainly
had no sympathy.

The great Concordat of Napoleon I was the most

eloquent and peremptory condemnation of Gallicani.sm.

Chi.gi. thought

the points he raised went a long way towards quelling the fears of the
Imperial couple and that Eug~nie especially was moved to having
.
. f a ll"b·1·
secon d t h oug h ts a b out h er qua 1ms regar d mg
1n
1 1 1ty.

26

Si.nee the resignation of Daru on April 12, Ollb:i.er had carried
the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry, but in mid-May the new minis ter was appointed, Antoine -Alfred Due de Gramont, who had been
serving as ambassador in Vienna.
out his

Gramont, of course, \\tas to play

unenviable and co!ltroversial role later i.n the Ems Dispatch

Crisis and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

The Due was

not unknown in Vatican circles as he had been assigned to Rome pre viously.

Chigi reported that Gramont 1 s religious principles were

so manifest that he did not have to inform Rome on that matter.

Two

other ministers were appointed at the same time, Charles Pli.chon
at Public Works and Jacques Mege at Cults.

Chigi spoke very highly

of these two in terms of their religious devotion and their loyalty to

26 Rapp 1607, May 14, 1870, ASV, Segr di. St, A 1870, R 243,
f 2, fols. 72-75.
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the Temporal Power.
Chigi's first conference with Gramont came May 19,

Gra-

mont was quite effusive in telling Chigi how highly he regarded the
Pope, and Chigi thus thought that Gramont would prove very dependable to Rome,

Gramont also said that interpolations and "violent

motions" could be expected soon in the Legislative Corps soon
regarding the council.

He told Chigi not to worry, that the govern-

ment could handle the situation should it arise.

28

On May 21, 1870, Chigi and the rest of the Diplomatic Corps
participated in the ceremony at the Tuileries marking the official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite.

The occasion was the

last triumph of the Second Empire and the last great ceremony of its
life.

Talk and publicity had earlier been in diplomatic circles that

Chigi was leading a movement to use the gathering to address a collective note of congratulation from the Diplomatic Corps to the
Emperor because of his success.

Chigi denied in a report to Anton-

elli that such a move was underway.

He said that as far as he knew

the English ambassador, Lord Lyons, and the Austrian ambassador,
Prince Richard von Metternich, were going to offer the individual

27

Rapp 1610, May 17j 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R
248, f 3, fols. 78-79.

28

Rapp 16_, May 20, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 80-81.
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greetings of their sovereigns to Napoleon because of the uncove ry of
the assassination plots earlier in the month.

Chigi had done this

for Pius IX in the audience of May 13, but he felt a collective congratulations by diplomatic representati'ves would have been inte rfe r ing in French politics.

29

On June 3, Chigi met again with Gramont, and the points they

dealt with were the council, the sojourn of French troops in Rome,
and the finances of the Papal States.

On the council, Gramont said

that action could still be expected in the chambers but that the Holy
See should neither take offense nor be upset.

He said that he had !"lot

spoken of nor given the least thought to bringing out the troops i and
in regard to papal finances, Gramont indicated that the time was not
ripe at the moment, but perhaps in the immediate future some measures could be taken to bring relief to the Holy See 1s treasury,

30

29

Rapp 1602, May 6, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 70-72. References to this rumored action we re made in M«!morial Diplornatique,
May 5, 1870, p. 339 and May 10, 1870, p. 353,
Lord Lyons thought that Metternich was the main catalyst
behind the move to present the collective congratulations and that
Chigi merely made some inquiries among other diplomats and found
them gene rally cool on the suggestion, Lord Newton, Lord Lyons,
A Record of British Diplomacy (London, 1913), VoL 1, pp. 287288.
In Henry Salomon, ~ambassade de Richard Metternich a
Paris (Paris, 1931), p. 245, reference is made only to the fact that
Mette rni.ch directed a personal congratulatory note on the plebiscite
from Franz Joseph to Napoleon III.

30

Rapp 1620, June 3, 1870i ASV, loc. cit., fols. 97-98.
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After this all-inclusive conference and its amiable results,
Chigi found time to leave Paris for the baths at Marienbad to get
some long-needed treatment.

The month of June spelt the beginning

of the summer hiatus in Paris, and the time was as good as any for
a respite.

Chigi was gone from Paris from approximately June 5

through June 15..

The fortnight spent at the resort did not bring

complete rest and diversion to the nuncio, as the ingredients for
another "publication of letters" controversy were put together dur·
ing Chigi's absence.
A letter addressed to Chigi from Monsignor Francesco Mercurellijl one of Pius !X's private secretaries, was published in
~

L 1 Univers, Le Monde;, and the Memorial Diplomatigue on June 21.
The letter said that the Pope was quite satisfied with the many letters
and messages of support for infallibility which had been received in
the past few months from .the French clergy,. and si.nce so large a
number of such messages had come to Rome, he found it impossible
to answer them all individually.

Mercurelli asked Chigi to make

individual answers and to make a general statement of the Pope's
appreciation.

As on the previous occasions during the 1860's, the

is one of the few references to papal finances that this paper will
make. However, the Chigi rapporti say much about papal finances
because the Vatican made several loans with French banks including
the Rothschilds. Also, the Peter 1 s Pence Collection was taken up
monthly in France and was forwarded to Rome through the nunciature.

:_~_.,-,
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French government took exception to the publication and was upset
that the nuncio had been enjoined to communicate with the clergy.
The old phrase, "Le nonce n'est qu'un ambassadeur," re-appeared
in a memo from the Minister of Cults to Ollivier.

31

This particular incident did not grow to the proportions of
the earlier ones.

Chigi quickly pointed out to the Quai d'Orsay that

he had been away from Paris when the note arrived and that a lower
official in the nunciature had taken receipt of it.

Thinking the letter

was of interest to the French clergy, the official judged that newspaper publication was the best way of handling the situation.

Chigi

verbally told Gramont how the error came about 1 and the whole matter was quietly and quickly dropped.

A repetition of the Nice affair

and the Syllabus letters was not to be had.

32

Towards the end of June and the beginning of July, Chigi
found himself pre-occupied with some rather routine matters.

An-

tonelli wanted him to inquire as to the status of the recruiting station
of the Roman Legion which Antonelli understood was about to be

31

Information on Chigi's absence from Paris is in Antonelli
to Chigi, #59041, May 30, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70
and Rubricella 343 (1870). The Mercurelli letter is in ANP, 186970 and Memorial Diplomatique, June 21, 1870, p. 495. The French
memo is Mege to Ollivier, June 20, 1870, AN, F 1 9 1924.
32

Rapp 1626, July 1, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870 1 R 248,
£ 3, fols. 162-163; Journal Officiel, June 24, 1870, p. 1077; and
M~morial Diplomatique 1 June 25, 1870, pp. 498-499.
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transferred from Altkirch in eastern France to Limoges, west of
Paris.

Antonelli wanted Chigi to find out if the rumors of the trans -

fer were true and what such a change would mean to the status of the
legion.

Another matter of interest was the continuing threat of an

interpellation in the chambers on the government's attitude toward
the council.

On July 1, Chigi wrote that Gramont had told him that

Daru might spearhead such an attack but that the cabinet was prepared.
A few days later, Chigi devoted much attention in a dispatch to a request by the Orleanist Princes to have the decree of exile against
them repealed.

33

Chigi 's pursuit of the status of the Roman Legion recruiting
station was to be fruitless.

The expected interpellation led by Daru

would never come. In the same dispatch in which Chigi devoted so
much space to the ·relatively innocuous petition of the Orleanists, he
made

~is

first mention of the Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish

throne.
At this point, some assessment can be made of Chigi's per-

33

niscussion of Roman Legion recruiting station in Antonelli
to Chigi, June 10, 1870, ASV, ANP, Segr di St, ANP, 1869-70 and
in Rapp 1623, June 17, 1870 and Rapp 1623, June 28, 1870, ASV,
Segr di St, A 1870, R 190, f 2, fols. 119-120 and 113-114.
Gramont remarks about Daru quoted in Rapp 1626, July
1, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870, R 248, f 3, fols. 162-163 and
Chigi remarks about Orleanist in Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, loc. cit.,
fols. 165-166.
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faced in these first six months of 1870 such as the council intervention move and the plebiscite.

Such an estimation is better placed

here because things were to be so different after the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War.

Certain trends and patterns emerge which

indicate some of Chigi's outlook and his manner of handling situations.
A striking but not altogether unexpected aspect of Chigi 's
reports is his way of evaluating members of the French government
rather solely in terms of their personal devotion and their support
of the Temporal Power.

That this kind of subject matter appears in

the writing of a Roman clergyman in the service of an about-to-be
infallible pope perhaps should not surprise anyone, and, given the
official nature of Catholicism in the Second Empire, this kind of
appraisal might seem somewhat appropriate.

Yet one would think

that a nuncio should be telling Rome more about a cabinet member:
such things as his family and political background, his ability to
handle his new post, and some of the projects or programs the new
minister might have in mind.

The Vatican and its nuncio should

have been concerned about these other factors surrounding members
of the government.

Chi.gi should have furnished much great infor-

mation on the key cabinet positions of Minister of Cults and the Foreign Minister, who activities and outlooks would affect the status of
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the Catholic Church in France and the survival of the Temporal
Power regardless of the number of prayers they said or the endless
pledges of support for the Temporal Power.

That Chigi's vision

was so limited was one of his major shortcomings.
Another side of Chigi is his almost paranoid concern for keep ing the French troops in Rome and his constant inquiry as to whether
they were about to be removed.

Instances of this appeared in. Chigi's

meetings with Daru and later with Ollivier and Gramont, when the
nuncio was the one who was always asking if the troops were about
to be pulled out.

When Chigi first heard of Daru's council interven-

tion plan, his first impulse was to link any such scheme to the threat
of pulling out the garrison.
suc'h project in mind.

There is no evidence that Daru had any

Chigi 's fears of French abandonment of Rome

was consistent thr'oughout the 1860 1 s as well.
"ritir~

Often the words

delle truppe'' appear in dispatches during that period even

though the government in Paris had given no hint of such an action.
Chigi 's rare comments on French politics seem somewhat
untenable, at times naive.

For example, he mentions Orleanism

numerous times, apparently regarding it as a potent force on the
French political scene.
force of the Left.

At one point he classified Orleanism as a

The evidence elsewhere is that Or lean ism was

barely organized at this point in the Second Empire and its adherents
were few; an Orleanist party hardly existed in the chambers.

Chigi
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gives some attention to the republican elements in France but always
lops them with extreme revolutionary groups.

Such a mistaken

generalization would be expected from a nineteenth-century churchman whose education and exposure were so severely restricted.
Chigi's reaction to the Le Creusot strike and the conspiracies in
early May were more vertiginuous than the government's.
What is lacking in the Chigi reports is a continuing and pointed
analysis of French politics.

His references to parties and opposi-

tion groups are in the vaguest of terms, and there is little talk of
chamber debates.

Chigi 's political comments are prompted only by

specific events such as civil strife or ministerial changes.

The state

of French politics was critical to the Vatican's interests, and Chigi
would better have served those interests by a greater awareness of
the whole picture ..
Chigi's place and standing within the Diplomatic Corps is
hazardous to assess because the evidence for forming such a judgment is extremely sketchy.

It has already been pointed out that the

French Foreign Ministry Archives are scant in resum~s on Chigi.
Standard secondary monographs on other important diplomats in
Paris such as Lord Lyons and Metternich make little reference to
Chigi.

Chigi himself writes only obliquely of other ambassado:::-s,

seldom mentioning any by name.

Chigi's role as Dean of the Corps

came into play only on ceremonial occasions.

There is little to
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indicate that he displayed much leadership among his fellow ambassadors.

34
This consideration has thus far elicited a view of Archbishop

Flavio Chigi at Paris as an ambassador qua ambassador.

The sum

total is that he was something less than competent and was crucially
short-sighted.
circumstances.

It has been observed how Chigi acted under "normal"
After mid-July of 1870, the predicament in which

Chigi found himself was anything but normal.

34

The references cited inn. 29 above are about all that is
said in Lord Newton's work on Lord Lyons and Salomon's monograph on Metternich concerning Chigi. In the case of one other
important member of the Paris Diplomatic Corps, namely the American minister Elihu Washburne, that situation was quite different
as will be seen in later chapters.

CHAPTER III

THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY, THE
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, AND THE
FALL OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

The Hohenzollern Candidacy to the Spanish throne came into
Flavia Chigi's life with the same unexpected suddenness that it entered the general European scene.

Foreign ministries everyv;here

commented on how no serious problems loomed on the horizon.
was summer, and everyone was on holiday.

It

There had been no hint

of a direct confrontation between France and Prussia since 1866.
Powers such as England and Russia remained on the outside looking
in, offering little chance to

upse~

the equilibrium.

States such as

Austria and Italy had too many internal problems to indicate that they
would cause any trouble that would disturb the peace.

Finally, in

far-off Spa in, Carlist wars, pronunciamentos, and civil strife had
been the order of the day for so long that no one seemed to take notice.
The Spanish had turned out their dissolute Queen Isabella II in 1868
and had been looking for an occupant of the throne ever since.

Few

had any idea that this search would produce the bombshell it did when
the Cortes under the leadership of the dictator General Juan Prim
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offered the throne to a member of the Catholic branch of the Prussian
royal family, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.
Chigi's activities in June and July of 1870 had not risen above
the level of the routine.

He had shown very little interest in Spanish

affairs, and the only thing remotely connected with Spanish events
which came to his attention was some correspondence which he handled for the exiled Isabella, then residing in Paris.

This correspond-

ence was superficial and consisted of Chigi forwarding notes from
Isabella to Rome.

The notes and letters were of a formal nature

and contained nothing in the way of political deals between Isabella
and the Holy See.

I

There is no need to say that after the Hohenzollern Candidacy
bec'ame public knowledge on July 3, the whole situation was drastically changed for Chigi.

He abruptly found himself handling several

issues of the most vital and paramount nature.

He had to follow the

intricacies of the unfolding Candidacy crisis and the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War.

1

There was then the war itself to be dealt

Most of these notes consisted of formal greetings from Isabella to Pius IX on religious feasts and so on.
Chigi did not meet
with the Queen, he merely acted as a post man. If Isabella wanted
to follow protocol in sending things to Rome, she had to use the
Apostolic Nuncio in Paris as she could use neither the Spanish Embassy nor the French Foreign Ministry.
Several biographies consulted on Isabella and other works
on Spanish political history of the time indicate nothing on Chigi.
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with, the disaster of Sedan, and the sudden appearance of the republic.

More importantly, Chigi was faced with the task of protecting

the Temporal Power and keeping the French troops in Rome, but he
would see Rome fall nearly as fast as the Second Empire.

In the end,

Chigi was to find himself in a besieged city wondering how to insure
his own safety and that of the other diplomats.
The world first heard of the Spanish offer to Leopold on July
3, 1870.

On July

6, the Foreign Minister of France, the Due de

Gramont, gave his famous chamber speech firmly denouncing the
prospect of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne and affirming
France's total opposition.

It was not until two days later that Chigi

sent anything about these developments to Cardinal Antonelli.
Throughout the days of the Candidacy Crisis, Chigi was remarkably
silent about the events unfolding around him on all sides, and he
later c.onfessed that things moved so quickly he could barely keep
up with them and that Rome could get as much information from the
newspapers as from him.

Thus he had little to say directly about

the original announcement of the Candidacy, Leopold's renunciation,
or the Ems dispatch.

His comments and actions were more general

as he evidently did not feel that he had to act as a news bureau.

It

will be seen that the Vatican's long-feared specter of France going
to war and abandoning Rome was immediately before Chigi 's
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eyes.

2

What Chigi had to say in his rapporto of July 8 was important,
however, even though his remarks came five days after the crisis
broke and were contained in an almost afterthought fashion at the end
of a dispatch primarily devoted to the unimportant petition of the Orleanist princes.

Chigi spoke of how the "stagings" of General Prim

had provoked such a disagreeable sensation in the French government,
but, more importantly, he said that experts on Spanish affairs whom
he had consulted thought the Candidacy was not serious or durable
and "they think that the emotion felt in the French government is exaggerated and without foundation.

11

These words were the quotation

of the opinion of others and not Chigi's.

The fact that he would send

the·dispatch to Rome meant perhaps that he leaned in the direction of
those who felt that France was over-vexed concerning the issue.

3

Later the same day, Chigi sent word to Rome of the mood
France was in now that the crisis was full-blown.

Chigi felt he did

not have to tell Antonelli how excited and repulsed everyone in France
was because of the news of the offer to Leopold.

He thought that the

2

Rapp 1634, July 17, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, Anno 1871, R
242, f 1, fol. 13 for Chigi's later comment about his not being able
to keep up with events.
3

Rapp 1628, July 8, 1870, ASVj Segr di St, A 1870, R248,
f 3, fol. 165.

r
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words which Gramont had spoken in the Legislative Assembly two
,

days earlier were the exact expression of the sentiments of the
nation, as the speech had been thunderously applauded.

But if Gra-

mont's words had received so much favorable support and reaction,
there were still many in Paris who thought the speech would have
the opposite effect than desired, namely that Prussia would be undaunted and that the Cortes would be goaded into electing Leopold
because of the harshness of the French stand.

All the talk of Leopold

needing King William's approval was nonsense, as several years
earlier another Hohenzollern, Prince Charles, had accepted the
crown of Rumania without William's consent.

Chigi was confident

that the Candidacy would not be confirmed in Madrid and that the danger of war would be averted.

Even now, Werther, the Prussian en-

voy at Paris, had gone to confer with William at Ems, and Chigi
though~

that only a ''happy and peaceful result would emerge."
Chigi 1s optimism of July 8 was largely justified.

4

Not all of

France, either in the nation-at-large or in the government, was
completely bent on war.

The same was true on the Prussian side,

given the well-known pacific leanings of King William versus the
belligerent hopes of his chancellor Bismarck.

4

Four days later came

Rapp 1631, July 8, 1870, ASV, Segr di St. , A 1871, R 242,
f 1, fols. 3-4.
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the renunciation by Leopold, the event which seemed to many to end
the whole affair.

Everyone breathed a sigh of relief.

Then came

in rapid succession the famous series of events: the Benedetti interview with Willi.am at Ems, the edited dispatch released by Bismarck,
and the violent French reaction which did lead to war.
Unfortunately, some of these particulars went unnoticed by
Chigi, for his next statement did not come until July 14 in a ciphered telegram to Rome:
The responses of Prussia carried by Werther
are evasive.
The renunciation of Prince Leopold
is personal.
The sovereign's guarantee that the
candidacy will not be reproduced is lacking.
This
was formally requested.
I am not without fear that something has been
promised to Italy for the evacuation of Civitavecchia.
5
Gramont has not yet commented.
Chigi 1 s confidence was now shattered.

He knew that France

at war could mean withdrawal from the Papal States, and he was al'

ready doing his best to learn what the French government would do.
He must have been trying desperately to see Gramont during the days
of July 12 through 14, but all he could say by the time of this tele-

5ASV, SegrdiSt, Al870, R 165, f7, fol. 17. Most of
Chigi's telegrams were sent in cipher but decoded, handwritten
copies are on file at the Vatican Archives.
The author did not have
to do any deciphering, only translating from Italian. Decoded telegrams are so marked on the manuscripts and are pieces of papers
much smaller than the rapporti.

r
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gram was that no comment could be obtained.

On July 15, Chigi sent another telegram:
Today in the Chambers there came what
amounted to a declaration of war. Werther is
gone. Minister of Foreign Affairs has told me
that for now there will be no change for the troops
occupying the Pontifical State.
Piedmont will
declare its wish to remain neutral.·
Actually, Chigi had not seen Gramont by this time but had received
the assurances through Ollivier.

Whether Chigi firmly believed what

French officials were telling him is doubtful because he doggedly
pursued the matter and also attempted to find out the attitude of Italy

.

regardmg the war.

6

The fact that Chigi was not able to see Gramont during these
days is readily understandable given the days -long activities in which
the cabinet was immersed.

Gramont had enough on his mind without

having to see the papal nuncio on business which was growing less
important by the hour.

The floor was occupied by the nations in-

volved: France, Prussia, and Spain; even the powers of England,
Austria, and Italy had to take a back seat.
room for a nuncio to be seen or heard.

There was not much

Chigi had not built enough

confidence in the French government or the Diplomatic Corps to be
called upon or consulted.

6

He represented a sovereign whose stand-

ASV, SegrdiSt, A 1871, R242, f 1, fol. 11.
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ing had diminished a long way since the days of Innocent III.

Chigi's

repeated ruffling of feathers of French officials through the 1860 1 s
had left him with no confidantes in important government posts,

The

nuncio had not established a firm and trustworthy relationship with
Napoleon III.

The French position in Rome became inconsequential

in the whole picture.

Chigi had no role in shaping the events of

July, 1870.
Chigi's supreme task was to keep the French in Rome, and
beyond that was the question whether Italy would stay neutral.

Chigi

was able to tell Rome that the French had found out that Italy had
opted for neutrality, much to the chagrin of the French.

Nigra, the

Italian ambassador in Paris, was spreading the word in the Diploma tic Corps that Italy wanted to stay neutral "at all costs. "

Chigi

was worried that the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel II, might carry

.

the day in Florence despite his own ministers 1 wishes.

Chigi. had

information that Victor Emmanuel was personally determined to
take up arms along side the French and had written to Napoleon III
to that effect, suggesting common tactics that the Italian and French
armies might follow.

Though he realized what such an alliance

would mean to the independence of the Papal States, Chigi did not
think that Italy would come in so quickly or that the French were
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realistically depending on the Italians to do so.

7

Antonelli said he appreciated all of Chigi's reports and efforts when he wrote to Paris on July 22.

Naturally he was pleased

to hear the French pledge from Ollivier that the garrison would re main in Rome, but such a pledge was not enough for the Secretary of
State.

Rumors were rampant throughout Italy, said Antonelli, that

a deal had been concocted between France and Italy which called for
the recall of the French troops.

Chigi was ordered to continue to

find out all he could and to keep Rome fully informed.

8

The next day, July 23, Antonelli sent further instructions to
Chigi to deliver without delay a note from Pius IX to Napoleon III.
The note was addressed personally to the Emperor and consisted of
a last-minute appeal for peace.

The Pope indicated that though he

was sovereign over a small territory, hi.s spiritual and moral authority was immense.

He hoped that Napoleon would put an end to the

'

wari1 and specifically offered mediationi1 adding that he had sent the
same note to William of Prussia.

Chigi was told to present this

7

Rapp 1636i1 July 19, 1870, loc. cit., fol. 30. At this junction in time in 1870, Chigi had nothing to say about the great event
at Rom ell the proclamation on infallibility.
Chigi, of course, had
more important business to attend to.
Beyond that, the likelihood
is that he refrained from any doctrinal comments because his job
was that of a diplomat.
8

Antonelli to Chigi, #59660, July 22, 1870, ASV, Segr di St,
ANP, 18 6 9 - 7 l.
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Chigi 1 s long-sought audience with the Emperor came on July
25 at the suburban palace of St. Cloud.

It had taken almost three

weeks while the crisis raged on and the war broke- out before Chigi
was able to meet with Napoleon.
ner all the previous ones had.

The audience started in the manChigi opened with a statement re-

plete with the usual felicitations: the Pope was the great spiritual
leader, the Pope blessed Napoleon III and his family, Pius IX was
ever grateful for the French"protection.

This last point was especi-

ally crucial at this date, and Chigi enlarged upon it, calling it the
glory of France and the Emperor.

The Holy See was even more

grateful now because Napoleon had maintained the garrison despite
the 'needs of war.

Chigi limited himself to these remarks, not at

any point asking tne Emperor directly how much longer, if at all,
French_ troops would stay in Rome.
Napoleon III did not mince words.

He seized upon Chigi's

last point by saying without any hesitation that "the needs of war"
had rendered it indispensable to recall the garrison from Rome.
This was all Napoleon said, offering no further explanations or apologies.
Whether Chigi was completely stunned by this announcement

9

Antonelli to Chigi, #59680, July 23a 1870, loc. cit.
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or had some forewarning, one can only surmise, but he launched
into furious argument on the portent of the French withdrawal.
was fraught with dangers and evil consequences.
the Papal States was at stake.
border ready to seize Rome.

It

The security of

Italian troops stood poised on the

If that was not enough, Chigi said,

Rome was always faced with the threat of the Garibaldian revolutionaries within the city itself.

Pontifical sovereignty needed the French

presence.
Napoleon stood firm despite the nuncio's pleas.

He said that

he could control the Florentine government, that Italy had learned a
lesson at Mentana several years earlier which it had not forgotten.
Chigi countered this by asserting that Italy had shown itself
to be completely irresponsible on a number of occasions in spite of
treaties solemnly agreed to such as the September Convention.
, Gramont, who had apparently joined the audience along with
the Empress Eug~nie, tried to justify the Emperor's decision as a
military necessity.

The French garrison amounted to only five

thousand men and was not much more than a police force, the Foreign
Minister said.

France further wished to avoid making the same

mistake that Austria had in the 1866 struggle of having to fight both
Prussia and Italy.

The main theater of the war was to be the border-

lands with Prussia, and France could not risk having to open a second
front so far to the south.

Gramont went on to say that France was
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not acting from fear, that the decision had been made unilaterally,
and that the Emperor had written personally to Victor Emmanuel appealing to the honor of Italy and reminding him of the provisions of
the September Convention.
The discussion continued a while longer as Gramont brought
out some evidence from French diplomatic agents that Italy would
behave and would not violate papal territory.

Chigi continued to

stress how essential it was for the French to stay and how the Pope's
own resources were not enough.

His arguments did not go much

deeper than this, and it was apparent that the French would not yield.
Chigi finally gave up hope of dissuading the Emperor and asked for a
later audience, which he never received.

Napoleon left for the front

several days later himself, never to return to Paris.
the last time Nuncio and Emperor were to meet.
second and final conference.

July 25 was

It was their thirty-

10

Chigi had no opportunity to offer the personal note from Pius
IX with its offer of mediation.

He wrote to Antonelli that the an-

nouncement of the troop withdrawal had precluded discussion of any
other items.

Furthermore~

Chigi thought, the Pope's offer was too

10 chigi 1 s description of his audience with Napoleon III is
spread over two rapporti, 1640 and 1641, dated July 26 and July 27,
1870P respectively, both found in ASV, loc. cit. There is no reference to this audience in the French National Archives or the Foreign
Ministry Archives.
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little and too late, as France was already so enthusiastically and
deeply at war.

11

The reaction from Rome was rather muted.

Antonelli told

Chigi that he understood fully how hard the nuncio had tried to change
the Emperor's mind on the decision to recall.

He took no comfort

in Gramont's contention that Italy could be trusted, emphasizing his
own belief, similar to Chigi 1 s that Italy did not have a reputation

.d.

f or ab1 mg by conventions or agreements.

12

An appointment which Chigi had a week later with Gramont
produced no further results.

Gramont offered declarations from

the ministry in Florence that they would abide by the September Convention and not intervene in papal territory, and he informed Chigi
of other intelligence which indicated that Italy would hold off.

Chigi

remained unconvinced as did Antonelli, who told Chigi later that
Italian intervention would come after contrived plots had been hatch'

ed.

Antonelli thought that even though France had departed from

Rome, perhaps it would pledge to return to protect the Pope should
Italy try to move in.

12
13

13

Antonelli to Chigi, #59809, August 3, 1980, lac. ciL

Rapp 1644, August 2, 1870, and Antonelli to Chigi, :!±59876,
August 10, 1870, ASV 1 lac. cit.

r
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For the rest of the month of August, the question of French
protection at Rome seems to have fled Chigi 's mind.

His reports

and other papers indicate that he was deeply engrossed in the progress of the war, following its every turn and sending almost daily
accounts to Rome.

The expected hand-wringing, knocking at the

Foreign Minister's door, attempts to see the Emperor, frantic mes sages to the Vatican, stern instructions from Antonelli, efforts at
gaining the support of prominent French politicians (or even the Empress) were all missing, indicating that the French withdrawal was
not totally unexpected and the Vatican was not caught completely offguard.

Chigi had often in the past come to the conclusion that the

French were about to pull out.

When they finally did as a major war

began, he could not have been totally surprised.

Through August,

then, Chigi studied a nation at war, and his testimony during that
month reads almost as a history of the war as seen from Paris.
Chigi was quite aware of the preparations underway once the
French had made the declaration.

He marvelled at the numbers of

men and quantities of material moving through Paris on the way to
the front.

He noted now the enthusiasm for war was so great in the

chambers, how the Emperor's government was stronger, and how
public fervor grew day by day.

He followed closely the various

maneuverings of the French army, how it was divided into several
corps, and the campaigns it followed.

Every indication is that Chigi
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was supporting France quite apart from his official position which
would also wish for a French triumph.

The optimistic temper which

reigned in Paris in the summer of 1870 caught hold of Chigi along
with so many others.

All believed that France would win.

Even

after Chigi reported that the French would leave Rome, he spoke of
the courage of the French troops and "the hope of final victory which
would confirm the superiority of the French Army."

14

Everything changed on August 4-5 as the French met early
minor defeats at Forsbach and Wissemberg on the French-Prussian
frontier.

These two battles were relatively minor scrapes in which

the French received small setbacks.

Politically the effect was

devastating as the general public began to realize the sorry shape of
the, Army.

Militarily, the effect was equally as devastating in the

next several days .as the French forces could not adequately re-group
and they began their haphazard retreat which would allow them to be
trapped at Sedan.
Chigi 's communication to Rome was abruptly punctuated with
a telegram on August 7 telling of the defeats and how they made the
situation grave.

Paris was readying itself for seige, a government

crisis ensued as the Chambers had been convoked, an appeal would

14

Chigi 1 s war information contained in Rapp 1634, July 17,
1870 and Rapp 1636, July 19, 1870, both in ASV, Se gr di St, A 1871,
R 242, f 1, fols. 13-17 and 32-33.
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be made to all the defensive forces of the nation, and the government
and the populace were resolved to defend themselves at all costs.
In a full dispatch two days later, Chigi spoke of Forsbach and Wis sen-

berg as "un disastro generale" and of the feverish preparations already in progress for the defense of Paris.

15

As August wore on, Chigi noted a great air of resentment had
grown in the city despite the appearance of public calm.

Dissatis-

faction appeared everywhere because of the erroneous government
announcements on the number of troops in the Army, the falsified
accounts from the front, and the generally inept way mobilization
was handled.

He complained, along with a great many French citi-

zens, that the only way to learn what was happening in the war zone
was to read the English newspapers which were uncensored and circulated daily in thQ French capital.

Chigi felt strongly that trouble

.

was brewing, and several times he mentioned revolution as a distinct
possibility.

The Emperor had better find himself a victory in the

field or be faced with problems back home with which he could not
cope.

As the French armies under MacMahon, Bazaine, and the

Emperor regrouped themselves, the feeling at Paris improved.

As

late as August 22, Chigi said that the French expected a "decisive

15

Telegram, August 7, 1870 and Rapp 1648, August 9, 1870,
bothinASV, loc. cit., fols. 90and 129-130.
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victory" soon.

16

On August 24, Chigi held his last conference with a Foreign

Minister of the Second Empire.

Prince La Tour d'Auvergne was now

Foreign Minister, as Gramont had resigned along with the rest of
the Ollivier ministry after Forsbach and Wissemberg.

La Tour

d 1Auvergne repeated much of what Gramont had said earlier.

He had

proof and assurance from Florence that the government would observe
the September Convention and guarantee the integrity and independence of the present pontifical territory.
such reports to the Quai d 'Orsay.

Nigra had continually given

At one point, the Italian am bas -

sador had shown La Tour d 'Auvergne confidential instructions for
General Cadorna, the Italian commander of troops now drawn up
along the papal frontier, that the General was to observe a line running from Orvieto·to Rieti (both towns are about sixty miles north of

.

Rome) and proceed no further.

Chigi did not give his reaction to

this meeting, but most likely he remained unimpressed.

17

Even though Chigi could talk at such a late date with the For-

16

Rapp 1650, August 11, 1870; Rapp 1652, August 18, 1870;
and Rapp 1654, August 22, 1870; all contained in ASV, loc. cit.,
fols. 133-34, 137-38, and 151-53.
17 Rapp 1655, August 24, 1870, ASV, Segr di St A 1870, R
165, f 3, fols. 96-97. In this report, Chigi does not say what he
himself said in the interview nor does there exist any response by
Antonelli.
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eign Minister about the security of the Papal States, the situation in
Paris was worsening.

The Prussian armies were getting closer.

The great fear was the Crown Prince Frederick's Southern Army
would bypass the French forces (then raggedly backing off to the Belgian frontier) and directly invest Paris without opposition.

No mat-

ter how it was to be done, an attack on Paris was a definite possibility, and in that case, Chigi's greatest responsibility would be to
maintain contact with Rome.

It was a nervous prospect which faced

all the members of the Diplomatic Corps.

Towards the end of the

month, Chigi was beginning to take steps aimed at collective action
by all the ambassadors to keep the diplomatic channels open.
position as dean came into full play in this episode.

His

18

On August 31, Chigi hosted a meeting of diplomats at the nunciature where they discussed their difficulties.

Evidently the am-

bassadors did not realize the lateness of the hour as two days later
'

came the French defeat at Sedan.

The news did not arrive in Paris

until September 3, and sometime during that day, Chigi telegraphed
to Rome:
The Emperor has voluntarily gone from Sedan
to offer himself to the King of Prussia.
MacMahon
not wishing to subscribe to the surrender has with-

18 Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870 and Rapp 1658, September 2,
1870, both in ASV, Se gr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 169-71 and
184-85.

,
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drawn forty thousand men along with Wimspffen .
. . • His Majesty has been conducted safely, going
to Belgium.

On September 4, Chigi wired:
The Republic is proclaimed.
Provisional
government installed without any opposition. All
is quiet.
Prussians march unhindered toward Paris.
Diplomatic Corps undecided on whether to leave or
stay. As for myself, I await the orders of Your
Eminence. 19
The rapidity with which event followed event in those early
days of September of 1870 is one of the most chronicled episodes in
French history.

The above telegrams, reproduced in their entirety,

are Chigi's only testimony as a witness to the tumultuous changes.
There is no other way to detect where he was each day, with whom
he conferred, how and when he heard about Sedan, whether he saw
any government officials, or if he personally saw such things as the
frenzied Chamber meetings or the various street scenes.

This lack

of detail is in marked contrast left by such individuals as Metternich,
Nigra, Lord Lyons, and the American minister Washburne. 20

19
All three telegrams in ASV, loc. cit., fols. 180, 176, and
182.
Metternich and Nigra were with Empress Eug~nie in her
last desperate hours at the Tuileries and aided her in her escape.
Lord Lyons had just returned from the front where he had unsuccessfully tried to see the Emperor.
Washburne gives vivid eye-witness
accounts of the Chamber meetings, the proclamation of the Republic
at the Hotel de Ville, and the street demonstrations in Volume I of
his Recollections of a Minister to France (New York, 1887).
20
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Only on September 6, at a time when he had more opportunity
to assess the situation, did Chigi pen a report to Antonelli.

He re-

ferred to the developments of the last several days as a "military
and civil catastrophe."

He expressed surprise and some sorrow at

the humiliating manner in which Napoleon III had surrendered to the
Prussians, as this action had played the major role in bringing down
the Empire.

Chigi also wondered how it was possible that such a

small group of politicians in the Chambers could proclaim a republie.

Even though a republic was the new order of the day, it did not

inspire much confidence or sympathy.

Talk was already heard of

either an Orleanist or a Bourbon being offered the throne.

For the

moment, the new government was to defer important questions of
internal political matte rs and foreign relations. concentrating instead
on the menace of the Prussians.

The government was determined

to resist Prussia to the last, but competent individuals doubted that
this resistance would be worthwhile or victorious, given the sad

21
condition of the Army.
By mentioning deferred action on constitutional quest ions,
the resolve to continue the war, the overwhelming Prussian threat,

21

Rapp 1660, September 6 11 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 198200.
The description of the immediate dilemma of the new Republic represents one of Chigi's better, if rarely correct, assessments
of French politics.

~

-76-

<;

r
'

and the immediate appearance of monarchist solutions, Chigi des cribed in a nutshell the essential problems of the Third Republic which
were to plague its entire life.

r

CHAPTER IV

THE FALL OF THE TEMPORAL POWER AND THE
PR OB LE MS OF THE SIEGE OF
PARIS

The disappearance of the Second Empire did not spell an end
of troubles for Flavia Chigi.

Rather, it served to open a Pandora's

box of agitation, a lost cause, and eight months of exile.

Trouble

enough it was for Chigi to have to face difficulties in Paris, but he
also had to do what was possible to stave off the threat besetting faraw<3;y Rome.
Towards the end of August, Chigi had become quite aware
that the Prussians were pouring into France at a rapid pace.

When

French inability to stop the invasion became apparent long before
Sedan, all Paris expected an attack or siege on the city.

The Diplo-

matic Corps knew that it could not escape any of the dangers in cum bent with such an eventuality, so they began to make preparatio:;:is.
The various ambassadors were split on what course to follow.
Some suggested that they should all go to French Army headquarters
so as to be near the Emperor and avoid being shut up in Paris.

Lord

Lyons was the particular proponent of this action, but Chigi thought
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it impractical as the French were not about to allow foreign agents
into their precincts.

Lord Lyons himself found this out when he

tried to visit Napoleon III at the front.
An alternative was being pushed by Prince Metternich.

He

suggested continual contact among the various diplomats and minis ters so that collective action could be pursued.

A series of meet-

ings toward that goal was begun at the end of August.
time, the diplomats decided to stay in Paris.

In the mean-

La Tour d'Auvergne

told Chigi on August 29 that the Empress was firmly determined to
maintain residence at the Tuileries, come what may.

The Diplo-

matic Corps thus decided to remain close to the Regent government.
As Chigi wrote all this information to Rome, he reminded
Antonelli of the "immense difficulty" which could lie ahead i£ Paris
were besieged.

With an interruption of communication with Rome

so likely, Chigi pledged to use every means of contact possible,
whether telegraph or railway i£ necessary.

Nonetheless, Chigi

begged Antonelli to send explicit instructions.

1

Before these instructions arrived, Chigi went ahead with
conferring with the other foreign representatives.

The first meet-

ing was held at the ninciature on the afternoon of Wednesday, August

1

Rapp 1657, August 30, 1870, ASV, Seg di St, A 1871, R
242, fl, fols. 169-71 and Rapp 1655, ASV, Segr di St, A 1870,
R 165, f 3, fols. 96-97.
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31.

It was previously agreed that the meeting would be of the most

casual and informal nature so as to allow free discussion and to avoid
any public image of panic.

Only full-ranked ambassadors were

present.
Those attending were unanimous in thinking that freedom of
action was of the utmost necessity, yet this freedom was dependent
upon what the French government would do in case of siege.

Much

discussion went into what the diplomatic community would do if the
French civil government should largely transfer itself out of Paris
and leave the city in the control of a military tribunal.

The official

status of the Diplomatic Corps would be very uncertain if it were left
under the authority of the Army.

Finding out the government's plans

was the urgent task of the moment, and each ambassador pledged to
ascertain this information from the Foreign Minister.

2

The battle of Sedan and the collapse of the Second Empire
rendered such inquiries academic.
obvious as the rising of the sun.

2

The fate of Paris became as
Full-scale flight from the city by

Rapp 1658, September 2, 1870, ASV Segr di St, Anno 1871,
R 242, f l» fols. 184-185.
Chigi does not name those who took part in the meeting, but
it can safely be assumed that Lyons, Metternich, and the Spanish
and Russian ambassadors were in attendance.
Nigra was likely
not present as he would have been persona non grata at a papal nunciature.

-80-

many citizens and officials began immediately.

Chigi found it vital

to see the Foreign Minister, but he was not able to get to the Quai
d 1 0rsay until September 8, six days after Sedan and four days after
the proclamation of the Republic.

There was yet another Foreign

Minister by now, Jules Favre ( 1809-1880), with whom Chigi would
have many negotiations in the days and months ahead.

Despite the

fact that France had practically lost the war and the Prussians were
knocking at the gates of Paris, Favre found the time to receive the
nuncio just as he had been able to grant interviews to Lyons and
Metternich earlier.
Chigi told Favre that he came in what was really an unofficial capacity because the Holy See had not extended recognition to
the ,new Republic.

The nuncio was concerned mostly about the fate

of the personnel and archives of the nunciature now that the Prus sians were on their way.

Favre gave his best assurances that the

Government of National Defense (the official title the provisional
government had given itself) would do its best to protect all foreigners and their property.
Chigi then asked if the foreign representatives in Paris would
be able to maintain contact with their home governments-.

Favre

said it was his desire to see the entire Diplomatic Corps kept togethe r outside the capital since Paris would be surrounded in a few
days.

The advantage would be to make use of the ambassadors in
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pos si.ble peace negotiations.

Favre painted a horrifying picture of

a bombarded city i.n which many innocent victims would suffer.
Surely such a spectacle would make the ambassadors do what they
could to work for a settlement of the war.
Then the conversation turned to the inevitable topic of the
safety of the Temporal Power.

With acute embarrassment, Favre

showed Chi.gi a dispatch he had received from Florence.

The Ital-

ian government had decided to invade the Papal States and take Rome.
Without allowing the nuncio to say anything, Favre tried to impress
on Chi.gi. the improbability of France coming to the aid of the Holy
See in repelling the invasion.
be done.
poi.p.t.

There was simply nothing that could

Favre then became quite emotional and personable at this
He hoped to convince Chi.gi that although his personal con-

victi.ons were in favor of the Sovereign Ponti.ff and France fully
understood what the Holy See was suffering, the Eldest Daughter of
the Church was powerless.

Chigi. had no response to this.

Favre asked Chi.gi if he knew whether the Pope would leave
Rome should Victor Emmanuel's troops enter the city.

Chigi said

he had no way of knowing what Pi.us IX 1 s intentions were and that he
hesitated to speak on this question for fear of misquoting his superior or giving mistaken impressions.

3

3

The description of the conference with Favre is entirely
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Chigi had ceased to make overt efforts to secure French aid
for Rome since his interview with Napoleon III on July 25.
conduct was little different in this meeting with Favre.

His

He did not

pound the table, he did not remind France of her sacred duty, he did
not threaten ecclesiastical punishment; the hour was past for all of
that.

He merely acquiesced.

Now that Italy had crossed the Papal

frontier, the handwriting was on the wall.

Chigi evidently agreed

with Favre that France could do nothing.

Chigi would not see Favre

or any other French official until after the 20th of September, the
day the Italian army captured Rome.

The end of the Temporal

Power was in sight, and Chigi apparently accepted that fate.
The instructions which Chigi had requested earlier arrived
on September 1 I.

Antonelli said that Chigi should follow the ex-

ample of the British ambassador in deciding whether to remain in
Paris or leave.

This suggestion was given in good faith, Chigi

wrote back the next day, but most of the diplomats had decided by
now that they would act in the best manner they saw fit regardless
of instructions from home governments.

For himself, Chigh thought

that it was best to stay on at Paris for as long as possible.

The in-

terest of the Vatican would be better served by his presence in the

contained in one dispatch, Rapp 1661, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 204205.
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capital.

Also, Chigi thought he might have a hand in mediating peace
.

between France an d P russ1a.

4

On the matter of what could be done to save the Temporal
Power, Chigi could only formulate theories.

If France yet sue-

ceeded in stopping the Prussians, then she would come to the Pope's
aid.

Perhaps the French would be persuaded that the September

Convention, being an international treaty, its validity continued under the new regime.

Chigi could not imagine that the Catholic and

Imperialist sentiments of some members of the new government
could not favorably be appealed to.

All these factors were ridicu-

lously tenuous, Chigi knew, and he told Antonelli on September 15
that he could not put into words the desolation and sorrow that the
news of the continued invasion of the Papal States caused in him.
There was no hope· now for any comfort or consolation for the oppres si~:>n of the Holy See.

5

4Antonelli to Chigi, #56166, September 6, 1870, ASV, ANP,
1869-70 and Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870, ASV, Segr di St, A
1871, R 242, f 1, fols. 206-207.
5 Rapp 1662, September 12, 1870 and Rapp 1663, September
15, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols 201-202.
In Rapp 1663, Chigi made a number of other comments worth
mentioning.
He saw "no possibility of success for the mission of
Signore Thie rs. 11 Chigi described an incident of a mob attack on
the Jesuit seminary in Rue Vaugirard in Paris and told of Interior
Minister Jules Simon's warning to Archbishop Darboy of Paris of
the difficulty the government might have in protecting Church properties -- a foretaste of the Commune. Finally, Chigi expressed
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On September 20, 1870, forces of the Italian government

under General Cadorna entered the city of Rome after token resistance and put an end to the Temporal Power of the Roman Catholic
pontiffs.

The last dramatic act of the Risorgimento was played out,

and Italy now had her historic capital.

Pius IX remained in the halls

of the Vatican Palace in unshakeable defiance of the new order and
began the long, self-imposed seclusion of himself and subsequent
popes whereby the Catholic pontiffs became known as "The Prisoner
of the Vatican. "
Chigi was given this grave news by Favre who presented him
with a telegram received at the Foreign Ministry which read:
After several volleys of cannon and a treaty of
capitulation, the Italians have occupied Rome. The
Holy Father has not left the city.
The same day Antonelli sent his own notification to Chigi and asked

.

him to round up support for the cause of the Holy See.

Chigi did

this and said he talked with General Trochu (the military governor
of Paris and nominal head of the Government of National Defense),
Favre, Lord Lyons, and Prince Metternich.

All said they deplored

the action of Italy but were powerless to do anything.

6

the hope that the French constitutional assembly, when elected, would
be composed of "good Catholics."

6

Rapp 1665, September 27, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 212213 and undated note in ASV, ANP, 1860-70.

r
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For himself, Chigi could only say that he was very sorry and
make some references to the "iniquity and the stealth of the horrible
government of Italy."

He renewed his pledge of loyalty to the Holy

Father and told Antonelli that he would continue to follow all his
orders.

There was little else to be done.

Question would have to be put off.

Action on the Roman

Chigi now devoted his full atten-

tion to the question of what the Diplomatic Corps was to do in a city

.

under siege.

7

After Sedan, the Prussians advanced virtually unhindered to
Paris and began the siege on September 19.

Large numbers of

French government officials had previously gone to Tours to establish some sort of center of authority which could keep in touch with
the rest of the country.
remained in Paris.

Important officials such as Favre and Trochu

The ambassadors of England, Russia, Austria,

Italy, and Turkey left the city soon after the siege began.
the only full ambassador left in the capital.

Chigi was

There also remained

the American minister Elihu Washburne (1816-1887), who was handling Prussian affairs in France, and an assortment of other ministers,
charges d'affaires, and consuls from smaller European and Latin
American nations.

The difficulty was at hand of being able to com-

7 Personal letter to Antonelli in Chigh's hand, September 26,
1870, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242, f 1, Fols. 208-211.

r

-86-

municate with home governments, and under Chigi 's leadership as
dean of the corps, the emissaries took steps to alleviate their situation.
A second meeting of diplomatic agents took place at the nunciature on Friday, September 23.

With the siege now in full force,

Chigi told his guests that perhaps their position was useless since
they could not send out dispatches.

General discontent was ex-

pressed that Lyons, Metternich and the others had left without
informing anyone and in violation of the agreement to hang together.
The problems as Chigi saw them were: when would be the proper
time to leave Paris, should the diplomats act separately or together,
and what steps might be taken to establish lines of communication.
Several ministers spoke their minds.

The Swiss minister Kern

thought that the C0rps should not leave until an official notice of
bomba.rdment had been given, as was the usual procedure according
to international law.

Kern suggested that Chigi should be entrusted

to go to Favre in the name of all the diplomats and request from him
what information he had.

Favre was to submit to the Prussian

military headquarters two points: ( 1) that the Diplomatic Corps be
allowed a weekly courier service to leave Paris, and (2) that the
Prussians would serve adequate notice beforehand of shelling of the
city.

Hopeless as it might seem to obtain these conditions, Chigi

assented to the mission and promised to reconvene the gathering
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when he had achieved any results.

8

Chigi got in touch with Favre immediately who promised to
forward the message to Bismarck when he would see the Chancellor
at Ferrieres.

Favre also said that France was very grateful that

the various envoys had decided to stay on at Paris despite the cruel
circumstances in which they all had found themselves,
Bismarck's reply, which came on September 26, was hardly
comforting.

He said he regretted that military considerations

would not allow him to divulge any plans or projects concerning attacks to be made against the city.

He was, however, disposed to

allow the weekly courier service provided that all correspondence
was left unsealed and contained nothing pertaining to military af-

fairs.

9
Chigi received this message through Favre on October 3 and

called a third meeting at the nunciature the next day.

In regard to

Bismarck's answer on the request for a bombardment notice, Chigi
said it was evasive.

The conditions Bismarck attached to the send-

ing of dispatches rendered it impossible for the Diplomatic Corps

8

Rapp 1666, October 3, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 42-43
and Washburne, Vol. I, pp. 127-128.
9 Favre to Chigi, September 24, 1870; Bismarck to Favre,
September 26, 1870, and Favre to Chigi, October 3, 1870, ASV,
loc. cit., fols. 19, 23, and 25.

r
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to avail themselves to the Chancellor's offer.
sent agreed.

All the envoys pre-

Some discussion ensued on whether diplomats actually

had the right to be notified of bombardment (Kern assured them they
did) and to the outrage felt at having to send dispatches unsealed
subject to the inspection of a foreign power.

Kern again took the

initiative and suggested that the diplomats themselves correspond
directly with Bismarck and tell him they rejected his statement.
Their cause might be better presented than Favre had been able to
do.

A committee of Chigi, Washburne, Kern, and the Dutch min-

ister Baron de Nyeveldt was appointed to draw up the letter,

10

The letter to Bismarck was composed and signed on October

6.

Fifteen names were affixed to it, the first being Chigi 's.

The

letter made reference to the message previously sent by Bismarck
indicating that dispatches would have to be left open.
said

t~ey

The diplomats

wanted to live up to their duties as foreign agents in a

capital under siege, but as diplomatic agents they could not fulfill
their roles under a condition of open dispatches.

If this restriction

was imposed they could not act as representatives of neutral powers

lORapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 1518 and Washburne, 1, pp. 159-62.
Rapp 1667, written several
weeks after all this happened, was the first dispatch Chigi wrote to
Rome after his arrival in Tours.
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and report to t h eir
governments proper 1y. 11

An uncompromising reply came from Bismarck on October
10.

Since the Prussian Foreign Minister Baron von Thiele had

given official notice to foreign governments on September 26 that
Paris was in a state of siege and that the freedom of movement of
diplomatic agents therein was subject to the military situation, Bismarck could only comply with this ruling.

The military situation

controlled everything, and Bismarck thought that international law
was on his side in demanding that all correspondence be left open.
The French government had itself decided to hold Paris, and their
decision had made Paris a fortress under siege.

The diplomats

who had chosen to remain with the government to which they were
accredited would have to suffer the inconvenience of being in a
sieged fortress, a·nd the Prussian government could not be responsible

~or

any consequences.

11

Diplomatic Corps in Paris to Count von Bismarck, ASV,
loc. cit., fol. 10 and Washburne, I, pp. 161-162. The diplomats who signed the letter were the following~
Chigi, ~ern, Washburne, Baron de Nyeveldt, Baron Adelswaerd
--minister of Sweden and Norway, Count de Moltke-Huitfeldt-minister of Denmark, Baron Beyens --minister of Belgium,
Lopez de Arosemena--secretary of legations for Honduras and
Salvador, Ratton--charge d'affaires of Brazil, Viscount de Lascastre~-charge d 1affaires for Portugal, Duke d 'Acquaviva- -charge
d'affaires of Monaco and San Marino, Martin--charge"d'affaires
of Hawaii, Thirion--charge d'affairs from the Dominican Republic,
de Ballivian y Roxas--Bolivian minister, and Galvez--minister of
Peru.
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A

0

national government at war with a power with which it had severed
diplomatic relations had shut itself up in its capital and foreign diplomats with it.

Such a set of circumstances was without parallel

in modern times, and it was rather difficult to determine what international law said.

Bismarck closed by saying that the envoys were

still able to communicate with him and King William, but in the end,
the diplomats had only the Government of National Defense to blame
for their problems.

12

The persistent obstinacy shown by the Prussian Chancellor
seems to have been the last straw for Chigi.
had come to leave Paris.

He decided the time

He made this decision feeling that it was

necessary to be in touch with Rome and with the rest of France as
well.

To leave Paris would provide him the liberty to receive

instructions from Antonelli and to be able to carry them out.

Also

there was the need to counter any influence Nigra, the Italian ambassador, might have at Tours.
pleaded at Tours.

The needs of Rome could be better

13

Accordingly, Chigi petitioned Favre to obtain a pass from

12 Bismarck to Chigi, October 10, 1870, ASV, loc. cit.,
fols. 12-13.
13

Rapp 1667, October 23, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 15-18.
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-91Bismarck through the Prussian lines, which Favre did with no
trouble.

Chigi hoisted the papal flag over the nunciature, sealed

and hid the nunciature files, and left the building and papal citizens
under the protection of one M. Haugel.

The nuncio left Paris on

October 10 by way of the Porte de Sevres,
the western gateway out
'
14
of the city.
Instead of heading directly for Tours, some 145 miles to the
west, as one might expect, Chigi made a surprising two-day stop at
Versailles, which was now the military headquarters of the Prussian forces.

There he asked for and received an astounding audi-

ence with the full array of the denizens of Prussian power: King
William, Crown Prince Frederick, Count von Bismarck, and Genera.Ivon Moltke.

Chigi's motive was predictable.

He told the

Prussian rulers that he wished "to call their attention to the sacrilegious invasion of Rome and to call upon the support of their offices
so that justice would be done to the rights of the Holy Father."
Though Prussia was now pre-occupied with the war, perhaps a time
and a place could be established in which a declaration of Prussian
support would come forth.
After this statement, Chigi got principle responses from

14
cessful.

Ibid.

Attempts to identify this M. Haugel were unsuc -
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Prince Frederick and Bismarck.

The Crown Prince spoke of com-

promise, saying that the possibility existed of finding a middle ground
between the privileges of the Holy See and the action of the Italian
government.

He expounded a number of reasons and answers for

demonstrating that the fall of the Temporal Power of the Holy See
and the establishment of another sovereignty in Rome would not weaken the independence and liberty of exercise of the Pope's spiritual
power.

Therefore the opposition emanating from Rome to the idea

of dealing directly with Victor Emmanuel's government had no reason
to exist.
Not wanting to hear this kind of advice, Chigi pointed out to
the Crown Prince the fragile nature of his suggestions, saying furtheT that they did not take into account in any manner the expectations
and inalienable rights of the Holy Father in this matter now called
the Roman Question.

Chigi's response was typical of any Vatican

representative! staunch opposition to any suggestion of a solution
which fell short of recognizing the Temporal Power.
Bismarck spoke next, giving a statement which tended to re fleet more official Prussian policy than Frederick's informal remarks.
The government of Berlin regretted what had happened to the Temporal Power but simply was not in the same position as the Catholic
states.

Prussia could not take the same interest as Austria, for

example, which was situated geographically closer to the Italian
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peninsula and was of necessity more concerned than Prussia could
be.

Prussia would pursue a policy unhampered by the other powers.
At the conclusion of the interview, the Prussian officials

begged Chigi to lay their respects before the Holy Father and to convey their respects to Cardinal Antonelli.

15

With his mission in Versailles an evident failure, Chigi saw

15 Rapp 1670, October 27, 1870, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110113.
This rapporto contains the only reference the author could
find to this interview.
Dr. Mortiz Busch's Le Comte de Bismarck
et Sa Suite pendant la guerre de France (Paris, 1879), p. 176 indicates that Chigi was in Versailles on or about Octo~er 16, and
had an interview with Bismarck, but does not describe the interview proper.
Bismarck's own published writings and memoirs likewise
contain little or nothing about this meeting.
His The Memoirs
(Ne.w York, reprinted 1966), II, Ch. XXIII, titled "Versailles",
says nothing.
Ch. XXIV, titled "Culturcampf", describes negotiations in mid-October, 1870 with Archbishop Ledochowski of Posen
and Bonnechose, Cardinal Archbishop of Rauen, in which the two
prelates tried (as Chigi had) to get Prussian support for the plight
of the Holy See.
Bismarck's Lettres a sa femme pendant la
guerre de 1870-71 (Paris, 1903) makes no reference to the meeting.
The French Foreign Ministry Archives contain no mention
of the meeting.
The Vatican Archives contain only Chigi 1 s Rapp
1670 and a follow-up note from Antonelli thanking him for his efforts, indicating that Chigi acted on his own in seeing the Prussians.
The only other place where this meeting could be further
explored would be Prussian and German archives.
Given the infinitesimal significance of this meeting in the whole picture of the
Franco-Prussian war, the conduct of German foreign policy later,
the career of Bismarck, etc., plus the fact that the author does
not read German, renders any further pursuit of documentation on
Chigi's confrontation with the Prussians meaningless.

~
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He left and arrived in Tours on

October 21, 1870 to begin an exile with a wandering government which
would last into the following spring.
July through October of 1870 had been a turbulent four months
for Archbishop Flavio Chigi.

In a sense, his entire world had col-

lapsed: an emperor he had respected was deposed, a government he
favored vanished, a pope he served had been humiliated, a comfortable diplomatic existence he had known was abruptly rent from hi.m.
A bad ti.me it was, though Chigi cannot be faulted for bringing all
these things about.

If i.t is not a question of Cpigi causing all his

own troubles, what should be examined are his reactions to these
events.
Chigi could easily have become maudlin and sullen once the
Second Empire evaporated.

The evidence is that he was undaunted.

A new government was in, and it did not matter that the form of that
government was of questionable acceptability to the Vatican.

Thus

Chigi immediately began to deal with Favre even though Favre was
a Protestant and the government was a republic.

Chigi was a dip-

lomat and was in no position to attempt to mold French politics, at
least not when the war was going so badly.
If the Second Empire was to disappear without so much as a

shrug from Chigi, the loss of the Temporal Power was another matter.

Chigi did feel the papal tragedy in a deeply personal way and
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admitted as much to Antonelli with many references to sorrow, pain,
disgust, desolation, and so on.

Such expressions are not often found

in diplomatic correspondence.
Chigi 's interior feelings notwithstanding, the foremost ques tion is, can it be said that the nuncio failed?

Looking solely at the

evidence, such as the withdrawal of the French garrison in late July,
the delinquency of Chigi in not working night and day to get the French
to return to Rome, and the entry of Italian troops into the Eternal
City on September 20, the answer to this question would have to be a
resounding "yes."

Yet because Chigi cannot be blamed personally

for all these things, the ineffectiveness of his mission lies elsewhere.
In examining Chigi 's role over the long run, that is, going
back to 1862, it is clear that the nuncio had not labored enough to
better relations between Paris and Rome.

He had held the Paris

nunciature at critical junctions in Vatican-French relations (the
September Convention, Mentana, the Vatican Council), but he lacked
either the courage or the finesse to use these and other opportunities
to shore up relations between Paris and Rome.

For Chigi to be as -

signed to the court of Napoleon III for eight years and still suffer
the ignominy of being told ex post facto about the troop removal indicates an immense shortcoming in Chigi in not establishing himself
in diplomatic circles or gaining the trust of officials of the Second
Empire.

r
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i

Chigi's continual squabbles with Napoleon III over such matters as writing letters to bishops and other violations of diplomatic
courtesy did not better relations and should have been cause for his
recall.
When the end of the Temporal Power came in sight, Chigi
had no one to turn to in France, neither the Empress, conservative
lay Catholics, or the French episcopate.

Chigi could argue voci-

ferously with Napoleon III and Gramont in the audience of July 25,
but that was the end of it.

It is small wonder that for the next two

months Chigi did almost nothing to protect the safety of Rome and
the Pope.
Flavio Chigi was the product of a thoroughly traditional Roman
Catholic indoctrination.
he could not emerge.

This put him into several traps from which
One was that he represented the usual seen

in most Vatican officials at the time: hard-headedness and lack of
imagination.

The pope was right, those who had other opinions

were wrong.

France must protect the pope, it was her sacred duty.

France's diplomatic services to help the pope in other ways could
not be utilized.

The pope must have the Temporal Power, no doubts

about this could be entertained.

Chigi refused to listen to talk of

compromise as voiced by Gramont in late July and by Crown Prince
Frederick in October.
Chigi was little different from his masters in Rome when it

-97came to the Temporal Power.

If Pius IX and Antonelli were to be

given over to their classic intransigence on the question of Papal
Sovereignty, the nuncio in Paris could act in no other way.

The

difference for Chigi was that he was out in the field and had opportunity to maneuver and improve things.

He could talk with persons

of other viewpoints and possibly get a different perspective on the
vi.ability of the Temporal Power.

He was in a position to see how

inconsequential the question of the independence of the Papal States
was in the total European picture.

He fell short of doing this and

thus helped make things all the worse for both France and the Holy
See.
Despite Chigi's omitting to build himself a solid base throughout, the 1860's which he could have put to use in 1870, one feature
running through the background does offer some defense for him.
The fact cannot be ignored that while Chigi himself seems to have
accepted the fate of the Italian takeover of Rome, the Holy See itself
acted little differently.

Inasmuch as Chigi did not rant and rave

and give off thunderous protests in Paris, Antonelli himself did not
toss up a storm when the French said they were pulling out.

Anton-

elli did not tell Chigi to knock on all doors or have Napoleon III excommunicated.

Only towards the end, as September 20 came

closer, did the Secretary of State begin to send out a few frantic
messages.

Once again, this conduct would indicate a certain fore -

r
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taste that Rome would one day be lost and the Vatican would not be
able to do much to prevent it.
Chigi can be charged with fa i.lure though such a statement is
not intended to heap the blame of September 20 on his shoulders
alone.

In his own surroundings, he could have alleviated the pre -

dicament to an extent that French influence could have been put to
better use or compromise over the Roman Question could have been
worked toward.
In regard to Chigi's handling of the problems of the Diplo-

ma tic Corps in Paris, Chigi met again with failure.

Here his lack

of success can bring no censure, as his actions in trying to deal with
awkward conditions were the best that could be hoped for.

It would

have been a Herculean task to wrangle concessions out of one such
as Otto von Bisma-:rck, especially when he was about to put the
stranglehold on the prize of Paris.
•

Hardly anyone could have per-

suaded the Iron Chancellor to allow sealed documents to come out
of the capital or to announce his tactics in bombarding the city.
Chigi did his utmost to preserve the unity of the Diplomatic
Corps.

His pride was not so great that he could not work together

with consuls and secretaries from such places as Haiti, Peru, and
Hawaii.

When Bismarck answered negatively the first time, Chigi

had no hesitation in going along with the other diplomats in appealing
directly to the Prussian chancellor.
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Chigi can be further commended on acting pragmatically by
staying in Paris as long as he did rather than follow Antonelli 1 s instructions or depart right away as Lyons, Metternich, and the
others did.

Finally, it was to Chigi's credit that, even though he

represented the Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic world, it was not
below him to co-operate with fellow envoys who themselves were
not Catholic or who represented non-C.atholic states.
Chigi's last venture before arriving in Tours, the audience
with the Prussian leaders, stands out as something of a pretentious
puzzlement.

Here was a nuncio accredited to France holding nego-

tiations with Prussia·.

Here was a nuncio who had recently com-

pleted a turgid exchange with Bismarck and was now trying to curry
his. favor.

Chigi revealed a considerable naivete by stating that he

wished that the time and place could be named when Prussia would
come to the Pope's aid.

..

How Chigi hoped to gain such a pledge by

making an appeal at a Prussian military headquarters in time of war
is incomprehensible.

Chigi's abject dismissal of Frederick's con-

ciliatory suggestions indicates how narrow-minded a Vatican diplomat could be.

The whole scene was another example of inept

Vatican forays into the world of realpolitik.

CHAPTER V

THE MONTHS AT TOURS AND BOURDEAUX

Flavio Chigi took up his own exile with the French government in Tours on October 21, 1870.

Tours, with a population of

60, 000 at the time, was a medium-sized industrial city some 145
miles southwest of Paris.

By autumn of 1870 1 it had become the

center of activity of the French resistance with the government now
situated there.

Refugees crowded into the city along with remnants

of the French army and throngs of government bureaucrats.
diplomatic corps had trickled into the city as well.
new stature as a

t~mporary

The

Despite Tours 1

national capital, things would not be the

same as they had in glittering Paris before the war.

Chigi did not

fit very well in this scene as the Diplomatic Corps could not function
as it had before and because the government was so disorganized and
preoccupied with the war.

Chigi's unwanted sojourn in Tours and

later Bourdeaux could normally be dismissed as a dull parenthesis
had it not been for the ticklish problem of the Roman Question.
Regardless of a dispossessed pope in Rome and a frenetic French
government fighting a quixotic;: crusade, Chigi plugged on at keeping
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the papal needs before French eyes.

1

Chi.gi.'s main contact in the Tours government was JeanBaptiste comte de Chaudordy (1826-1889).

A career diplomat who

was serving as first secretary of the French embassy in Madrid
when the Hohenzollern candidacy crisis broke, Chaudordy was appointed

~elegue" for foreign affairs since Jules Favre had remained

in Paris.

Chaudordy was a loyal Catholic and monarchist, and his

sympathies undoubtedly lay with the plight of Pius IX.

Chigi saw

fit to appeal to these sentiments but was to meet with little success,
a failure due more to France's debilitation rather than a weakness
of will on Chaudordy's part.
The nuncio and the acting foreign minister held their first
meeting on November 7, 1870, in circumstances far less formal than
had been during the peaceful days back in Paris.

The substance of

the exc::hange was Chigi presenting a circular protest from Antonelli
which referred to France's responsibility of supporting Pius IX
under terms of the September Convention.
was curt and to the point.

Chaudordy's answer

France had a new government, and it

1
According to one source, Chigi was lodged in Tours at the
home of the Marquis de Mondragon.
Leonce DuPont, Tours et
Bordeaux, souvenirs de la Rtpublique ;{ Outrance (Paris, Dentu,
1877), p. 58. DuPont further describes Chigi as being "the best
lodged and provided for" among the diplomats in Tours, some of
whom had to search hard for adequate shelter.
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could not be responsible for acts and agreements made by previous
men who were either dead or out of office.

2

The brief exchange was typical of several which Chigi would
have with Chaudordy.

The frigid atmosphere and the brevity of

Chigi's descriptions resulted from the exigencies of the war-time
state of affairs and the consequent dispensation with ceremonials.
Specific appointments were hard to get.
ing from the Pope were forgotten.
Father were completely unheard.

Formal statements of greet-

Pledges of support of the Holy
The length of conferences was

severely curtailed, even to the point that some appear to have been
chance meetings in corridors.

Ultimately, Chigi was competing

with the Franco-Prussian War for the attention of the acting foreign
minister.
On November 13, Chigi had another conversation with

Chaudordy.

Chigi found that Chaudordy actually did lean toward

supporting the papal cause, and, more importantly, Chaudordy gave
forth with a complete report on talks he had been having with the
Italian ambassador, Constantino Nigra.

Basically Chaudordy had

2

Rapp 1676, November 7, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1,
fols. 128-129.
Chaudordy's correspondence is at the Archives du Ministere
des Affaires Etrang'eres, Papiers des Agents du Minist~re des
Affaires Etrangeres, Inventaire No. 52.
There are fourteen volumes which cover the years 1864-1890.
These volumes contain no
letters exchanged with Archbishop Chigi.

..
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told Ni.gra of his own personal belief that what was goi.ng on in Rome
was against the rights of the sacred person of the Holy Father.
Nigra attributed these disturbances to the actions of returning
Roman emigrants who had taken advantage of the situation.
the Italian government was not to blame.

Surely

Chigi thought it was easy

to see the vanity of this argument as the authors of disorder were to
be found in the Florentine government.

3

The substance of this conversation may not appear to be
very great, but a precedent was bei.ng established.

Obviously,

there was a willingness by Chaudordy to divulge this information.
Chigi was much more eager to hear what Nigra had to say than was
Nigra's desire to know the papal nuncio's thoughts.

A small but

necessary diplomatic chain was being linked up between Rome and
Florence by way of Chigi, Chaudordy, and Nigra.

Cumbersome

as this roundabout path was and short-lived as it was to be, it did
•
prove useful to Vatican-Italian ties in that at least some exchanges
were made even if they were of an unfriendly nature.
Chigi learned from Chaudordy on November 29 that Nigra
carried a response from Florence to the papal protest aga i.nst the
seizure of the Quirinale Palace.
Antonelli.

3

The note was to be forwarded to

Chigi took particular exception to the Italian contention

Rapp 1686, November 24, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 151-152.
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that the seizure of the Quirinale was not an act of theft because the
palace was not a pontifical one and was therefore no different from
the many other palaces in the city of Rome.

Chigi wondered what

Florence could be thinking in view of the popes who had lived in the
Quirinale, the conclaves held there, the sacred congregations which
had used it, and the various palatine cardinals who resided within
its walls.

Chaudordy further added that he had spoken to Nigra

about Chigi's concern for the Italian government's position on allowing the Vatican to keep collecting the Peter's Pence and the Holy
See 1s right to maintain consulates.

Nigra promised he would in-

quire with Florence on these matters.

4

Chigi welcomed this approach by Chaudordy and his readiness to help the Holy See by presenting Rome's case to Nigra.

Chigi

saw that Chaudordy's original aloofness of November 7 indicated not

.

a lack of understanding but rather the need to make the firm impres sion that France was utterly helpless to render direct aid to Rome.
Aside from this, other means were definitely available, and the
presentation of remonstrances to Nigra was one, such way.

On

December 1, Chaudordy requested Chigi to keep him fully supplied
with documentation of acts of violence in Rome and other attempts
at hampering the freedom and dignity of the Holy Father.

Chaudordy

4 Rapp 1688, November 29, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 167-69.
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'

pledged that he would submit such papers directly to Nigra and would
support the Vatican protests.

5

These brief encounters between Chigi and Chaudordy repre sented a major change in Vatican tactics.

After Sedan and the 20th

of September, the time had ended for Vatican hopes of French military aid to oust the Italians from Rome.

For the moment, the best

path lay in the strictly diplomatic way: get French statements of
support, have the French make protests of their own, urge the
Government of National Defense to lead the way among Catholic
powers to abet the Pope's distress.
Chigi did not see Chaudordy again until near the end of 1870
because on December 10, the Government of National Defense was
forced to make an abrupt departure from Tours since Prussian forces
were reaching out·from Paris and could not be stopped.

The gov-

ernment quickly ran off for the safety of Bourdeaux and the Atlantic
'

coast.

The departure from Tours was more sudden than the grad-

ual withdrawal from Paris in September.

Chigi had no hesitations

about accompanying the government on this move, and he joined in
with the continued exile.

6

5 Rapp 1689, D;ecember 1, 1870, loc. cit., fols. 161-62.
6

A special train was outfitted by the Government of National
Defense to carry the diplomatic corps to Bourdeaux on December
10, 1870.
Some of the distinguished envoys were forced to double
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In an interview on December 20, Chaudordy explained to
Chigi that the French ambassador to Florence had been recalled.
The ostensible reason was to prevent his presence in Florence from
interfering with the mission of Adolphe Thiers who had arrived
there on his journey of European capitals begging for help for France.
Chaudordy did not connect the recall to any dissatisfaction from
Rome or that the recall was a sign of French support for the Holy
See.

Chaudordy did mention to Chigi the problem the French even-

tually would have when Italy officially transferred the capital to
Rome and the French embassy would have to follow.

The hypo-

thesis of whether this would represent an official French sanction
of September 20th would turn into an actual crisis the following
summer. 7
Another conference with Chaudordy on January 11, 1871
produced further warm support.

Chigi and Chaudordy discussed

possible action the C;:t-tholic powers might take to aid the Pope. The
time for protest from the Vatican was nearing an end as the world

up in space because facilities were in short supply. Accordingly,
Chigi had to endure the unpleasantness (undoubtedly for him) of
sharing a compartment with Mohammed-Pasha, the Turkish ambassador. Dupont, p. 246.
In Bourdeaux, Chigi stayed at the
new archiepiscopal palace recently completed by Cardinal Donnet.
Dupont, p. 226.
7 Rapp 1693, December 20, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1,
fols. 190-191.
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seemed to understand well enough by now the nature of Pius 1 plight,
thought Chaudordy.

The delegue' expressed his inclination to begin

talks with Rome and other friendly powers on working together.

To

shore up his pledge, Chaudordy mentioned that he had spoken to
Nigra of his discontent with the recently passed Law of Guarantees.
Taking note of recent attempts by Beust, the Austrian foreign minister, to try to bring Italy and the Holy See to the conference table,
Chaudordy said he wanted to take part in these moves, but added
that he would do so only with the full knowledge and cooperation of
the Holy See.

8

Through these various maneuvers and exchanges, Chigi.
seems to have achieved a strong advantage.

He had managed to

ben,d the ear of a hastily-formed, distressed, and critically truncated provisional government.

An early abandonment and abnega -

tion of the papal cause had been slowly waxed into mild compassion.
A France brought to her knees still had her sentiments as eldest
daughter of the Church.

Fiery protests would still emanate from

Rome, Italy would continue it's sacrilege, France was still thinking more of Prussians than of priests, but a new turn in an old
direction had been accomplished.

8

Rapp 1702, January 12, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8,
fols. 23 -24.
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By January of 1871, Chaudordy's attitude was not the only
thing that was changing in France.

The Franco-Prussian War had

run much of its course, though the protracted peace negotiations
and their consequences still lay ahead.

Post-Second Empire France

was definitely emerging, and Chigi was keeping his ear tuned to the
new shape, so vital to Vatican interests.

With this new France

were coming new leaders, and Chigi was soon to find that the chief
person to reckon with in the French government was no longer to be
the Comte de Chaudordy but Adolphe Thie rs.
The profound changes which swept France in 1870 and 1871
did not escape the observant eye of Archbishop Flavio Chigi.

On

the one hand was the military holocaust which came over the land,
the. defeat of French arms, the humiliation in the field, a third of
the nation under occupation, the capital laid to siege.

Then there

were the political changes in both form and members: the loss of
the imperial system, new but old leaders, the uncertain republic.
Beyond all of this, there was a change in character and outlook
which Chigi watched constantly.

Old arguments and issues such as

plebiscites and the power of the emperor were now moribund.

The

Prussian threat looming across the Rhine so hotly debated for years
was not an omnipresent reality.

The issues now were such things

as what had gone wrong, why had glorious France been swamped
with such ignominy, who was responsible, and what could be done
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to bring France out of this horror.

As Frenchmen of every type

and stamp grappled with these profundities, Chigi was ever attentive because how soon and how well the Papal phoenix might rise out
of the ashes depended so much on the manner in which the new
France would emerge.
As early as October of 1870, Chigi sensed a certain direction
that the French mode of thought was drifting toward.

Already the

hope was high that the upcoming elections for the constitutional as sernbly would retain a majority in favor of the cause of "order and
the Church."

In every part of France, the result of the defeats and

all the tears was an impression among Frenchmen that a sensible
return to God was the only path of hope.
a w,ay to expiate the disasters.

A return to religion was

There was no mistake in noting that

the announcement .of the withdrawal of the French troops from the
Papal States coincided with the first defeats suffered by French
forces.

The slap in the face of the Pope had precipitated the wrath

of God on France.
Chigi said he had received such sentiments from laymen of
every opinion, not to mention ecclesiastics and members of the hierarchy.

A principal spokesman for this point of view had been none

other than General Louis-Jules Trochu (1815-1896), nominal head
of the Government of National Defense.

Trochu had expressed such

beliefs to Chigi in a manner "so elevated, moving, and decisive,

11
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as would befit a person of "such political intelligence" and one so
"profoundly Catholic."

The General had begged to be placed before

the feet of the Holy Father to implore the apostolic benediction,
pledging his hope of a resurgence of France to its ancient strength
and splendor to the point where France would not fail to do i.ts duty
to the Holy Father.

9

Chigi 's typically boundless optimism about the extent of
favoritism toward Rome existent in France was soon tempered by a
closer look into the state of French politics.

Where once he had

seen devoted angels of French conservatism everywhere, he now
saw the satanic agents of socialism and revolution lurking behind
every tree.

Writing in December, Chigi said that there existed in

all.French cities groups of men of the most subversive tendencies.
These men were going to take advantage of the preoccupation of the
Government of National Defense "to bring about the triumph of their
•
domination.

11

Events in cities throughout France where riots had

occurred and religious orders had been forced to close their schools
indicated that these "acts of barbarism" were meant to stabilize

9

Rapp 1668, October 24, 1870, ASV, A 1870, R 165, f 1,
fols. 103-06.
Chigi's reference to Trochu's "political intelligence"
represents one of the nuncio's most exemplary off-the-mark judgments about French politics.
An ironic note creeps in here in that when Chigi referred to
France's "resurgence", he used the Italian word "risorgimento",
a fact which probably made him cringe.
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"the terrorism of the Socialist and Republican movement."

It was

a comfort to see that the majority of the nation was not involved in
this movement and that this portended the "probability of a turn of
events in France favorable to order and the tradition of honor.

11

10

As late as February, 1871, when France was heading toward
internal peace with the impending election of its constitutional as sembly, Chigi was still sending reports to Rome on democratic and
socialist plots to keep up the terror in the street, to seize control
of the assembly, move the capital to Marseilles 1 give the dictatorship to Gambetta, and wage war against Prussia~ outrance.

Chigi

said he had no difficulty in seeing how these schemes were related
to the activities of similar factions working outside of France.

11

Somewhere between the Scylla of the clericals and the Charybdis of the revolutionaries, the reality of French politics emerged in
the outcome of the elections for the Constitutional Assembly held on
February 8, 1871.

With a two-thirds majority of the Assembly

rendered to trustworthy monarchists and conservatives, Chigi
deemed it safe to say that the Assembly was composed of men "ardent for peace and order."

lORapp 1697, December 29, 1870, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9,
fols. 79-81.

11 Rapp 1710, February 2, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2,
fols. 74-77.
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Right now, the task facing the new Assembly concerned matters of peace and war; after that would come the crucial debates on
what the form of government of France would be.

Chigi was sur-

prised at the vitality and numbers that the Legitimatists had shown,
a strength in their ranks which had previously gone unnoticed.

Chigi

was anxious to see how this group would work with the bloc of Orleanists and other conservatives.

Of the 100 or so deputies who "leaned

toward revolution," Chigi discounted them saying they had neither
the strength nor numbers or internal unity to put their machinations
.
12
into action.
Chigi saw the li.ne of conduct of the Assembly following three
main points.

First, those who stood for order would have to pre-

sel"ve their unity, whatever the diversity of their opinions might be,
to combat the party of disorder.

Secondlyll the Assembly must put

.

aside for the moment any question of the form of government and
must itself act as the government of France without becoming too
attached to the principles of republicanism.

Finally, the peace with

Prussiall whether in terms of territorial cession or an indemnity,
must not be allowed to bring on the ruination of France, either to

12

Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 79-82.
Chigi further noted to Antonelli that Archbishop Dupanloup had been
elected to the Assembly, adding (perhaps facetiously) that he hoped
Dupanloup 1 s influence could be used to the advantage of the Church.
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her military defense capabi.li.ti.es or to the strength of the public
treasury.

13

The first order of business the Assembly took up was the
erection of an executive admi.nistrati.on.

Chi.gi. recognized from

the begi.nni.ng election results that the formidable veteran of French
politics, Adolphe Thi.ers, was to be the most powerful figure i.n the
group.

The Assembly had barely held its first session when Chi.gi

wrote that Thi.ers "would give the movement and the direction to
the Assembly.

11

Thi.ers 1 dedication to public affairs would make it

easier to seek solutions to the important questions at hand.

Al-

ready, Chi.gh thought, Thi.ers was acting i.n the manner of a head of
state before the power was given hi.m officially.

14

The Constitutional Assembly di.d exactly thi.s on February 16,
1871, after strenuous debate on the nature of Thi.ers 1 power and
title.

Chigi. saw the actions as a temporary fusion of the monar-

chi.st factions for the sake of convenient peace.

Thiers, Chi.gi

13

Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-86.
In thi.s same dispatch, Chigi. relayed the good news that
Guiseppi Garibaldi., the fanatic leader of the Ri.sorgimento, had
decided not to take his seat in the new Assembly.
Garibaldi had
come to France to fight on the French side in the Franco-Prussian
War.
He had gained the status of a national hero when his unit
captured a Prussian battle standard during a mi.nor skirmish.
Thi.s notoriety gained him enough prominence to win a seat, but, as
indicated, he declined the honor.
14
Rapp 1714, February 13, 1871, loc. ci.t.
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said, wanted the full title and prerogative of President of the Republie. but was denied this because in the view of so many Legitimatists
republicanism was tantamount to socialism.

15

The news of the Thie rs election was warmly greeted in Rome.
Antonelli wrote that the influence of Thie rs in the current papal
plight seemed ''indubitable.

11

He urged Chigi to get Thie rs to turn

his attention toward the cause of the Holy Father, so that "the authority of his voice and his eloquence • . . would lead his country on
that path • • . in the glorious tradition of its history.

11

France's

whole volte face in electing the conservative Assembly was viewed
very well in Rome.

Antonelli enjoined his nuncio to use "every

appropriate circumstance to explain the fate of the Sovereign Pontiff
to the Chief of the Executive Power.

1116

As regardS' Thie rs 1 attitude toward the all important Roman
Questi?n, Chigi found from Chaudordy that the new chief executive
had taken great care in his first days in office to investigate the state
of relations between France and all other powers.

In particular

concerning Rome, Thiers 1 had shown himself to Chaudordy to be
satisfactory to the interests and rights of the Holy See.

15
16
fol. 83.

This was a

Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit.

Antonelli to Chigi, #1065, February 26, 1871, loc. cit .•
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good beginning for the papal cause, but the details would be long in
working themselves out.

17

A further sign of French stability began to appear during the
month of February as various European powers began to accord
diplomatic recognition to the nascent Republic.

This recognition

had never been extended to the Government of National Defense des pite the continued presence in Bourdeaux of the diplomats ace redited
to the defunct Second Empire.

Britain, Spain, Austria, and Russia

were among the first to have their representatives present credentials to Thie rs, followed by Italy toward the end of the month.

18

The Holy See was rather slow in taking this defini.ti.ve step.
One reason for this was the government of the Holy Father had all
the. doubts in the world about recognizing a republic, although this
factor is negligible in Chigi 1 s correspondence.

More important

.

was whether France on its part would name an ambassador to the
Holy See.

The previous ambassador, the Marquis de Banneville,

had resigned in September of 1870 upon the abdication of Napoleon
III, in accordance with diplomatic courtesy which requires such
action when a head of state leaves office for whatever reason.

17
18

From

Rapp 1715, February 17, 1871, loc. cit.

Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8,
fols. 39-42.
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September on, the French embassy in Rome was under the direction
of the charg~ d'affaires.
The situation for foreign powers to have diplomatic relations
with the Holy See was made very delicate since the seizure of Rome
by the Florentine government.

Foreseeing the inevitability of

transfer of the Italian capital to Rome, European governments pondered if they should have one representative in Rome for both
Victor Emmanuel and Pius IX or if the old system would continue.
The naming of a French representative to Pius IX with the full rank
of ambassador would be a victory for the Vatican.
France herself began to name ambassadors to the major
courts of Europe as these other states sent their recognitions to
Bordeaux.

By late February, French diplomats had been dispatch-

ed to London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Madrid.

Chigi tele -

graphed this information to Rome, noting that what was missing was
the appointment to the Holy See.
sured Chaudordy as to the reason.

Disturbed by this, Chigh presChaudordy gave assurances of

the firm intention of the French government to make such an appointment, but that the delay was caused by an inability to find the right
person for the part.
prime candidate.

At the present, the Due de Corcelles was the

Chigi asked Rome what it thought about having de

Corcelles named, and Antonelli replied that "so distinguished and

r

-117-

Catholic a man [as de Cordelles] would be most acceptable."

19

Chigi had been anxious for some time to see the new Chief of
the Executive Power.

This had been denied him although other dip-

lomats in Bourdeaux had conferred with Thiers.

Chigi seemed to

think that his inability to get an appointment was due largely to
Thie rs 1 repeated absences from Bordeaux in connection with the
peace negotiations.

2

°

Chigi finally visited with Thie rs on March

10, 1871.
The audience was formal in nature and was reminiscent of
the meetings Chigi had held with Napoleon III.

Chigi opened the

discussion with official salutations from Pius IX on the occasion of
Thie rs 1 election.

Then he set out to press three main points.

First he wanted to call Thie rs 1 attention to the "indignant and intolerable" state to w.hich the Holy Father had been reduced by the Italian government.

Second, Chigi touched on the urgency of France

appointing to the Holy See a person who would be "the symbol of the
Catholic intentions of France" and one who would represent the
majority found in the Assembly.

In the third place, Chigi spoke to

Thiers of his hope to regulate the life of the Church in France, say-

19

Rapp 1716, February 22, 1871, loc. cit. and Antonelli to
Chigi, #1103, March4, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 43.

20

91.

Rapp 1718, Marc-h 2, 1871, ASV, A

1871~

R 165, f 9, fol.

r
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ing that a good place to start was in the filling of vacant sees.
Thiers replied very cautiously to Chigi's talk of the gravity
of the Holy See's troubles.

Chigi seemed to think that Thie rs was

somewhat indifferent and simply did not comprehend the enormous
dangers facing the pope.

Thiers merely made some references to

the limits of power of his office which prevented him from any great
enthusiasm for supporting a foreign monarch.
On the matter of appointing an ambassador to Rome, Thie rs
said he was indeed at work on this business, but the greatest consideration was that he hoped to find an individual who was agreeable
to the pope.

Thiers thus reaffirmed what Chigi had heard earlier

that the delay in naming some one to Rome was caused by the inability •to pick the right man.
In closing his description of this meeting, Chigi confided to
Anton~lli

his personal impression of Thiers saying that in all his

speeches and writings, Thie rs worked with the intention of avoiding
any definite opinion and of avoiding solutions of all questions, leaving them hanging for the future. "

21

21

Rapp 1721, March 10, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 84-87.
Chigi and Thie rs did discuss Chigi 's third point about naming bishops to vacant sees in a vague and inconclusive manner. The
particulars mulled over by the two men will be treated later.
The private papers of Adolphe Thiers are scattered in several locations in Paris: at the Biblioth~que Nationale, at the Foreign
Ministry .A,.rchives, and at the Biblioth'eque Thie rs.
The documents
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For its part, the Holy See slowly got around to sending the
credentials for its nuncio to France although Chigi had requested
them in mid-February.

By mid-March, Chigi wrote to Rome that

inasmuch as the other powers had afforded their recognition to the
new regime, any further delay might offend Thiers.

Antonelli

yielded to this request although the French had still not settled on
who the ambassador to Rome would be.

Chigi received the proper

credential papers on March 25 and immediately requested an audir

ence with Thie rs which was granted him for March 30.

22

By this time, another sign of France's increasing stability
had appeared on March 10 with the removal of the government from
its provincial stopping place in Bourdeaux back to the more permanent location of Versailles.

Thus» the presentation of credentials

took place there. ·
The mood was very different from the time Chigi had pre sented his credentials to Napoleon III more than nine years earlier.

consulted by this author in the AMAE proved to be useless.
The
Biblioth~que Thiers was closed for unexplained reasons during the
author's stay in Paris in the fall of 1971.
Given the previously noted paucity of documents in French
Archives on Chigi, it was deemed that gaining entrance to the
Biblioth~que Thiers would probably have been futile.
22

Rapp 1723, March 12 1 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols.
133-134 and Rapp 1727, March 25, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 162, f 8,
fols. 60-61.
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France was depleted.

There was no ride in a state coach for Chigi.

There was no full court assembled.

Chigi himself remarked later

that the form was one of complete privacy.

Thiers attempted to

express his "extensive loyalty" to the Holy Father but hastened to
add that the notorious state of affairs in France rendered her powerless to respond to the expectations of His Holiness.

Thiers then

gave some information that Chigi was elated to hear.

The new am-

bassador to the Holy See had been named, and he was BernardHippolyte-Marie, Comte d'Harcourt (1821-1912).
was good news to the nuncio, there was a catch.

Although this
France had also

named an ambassador to Italy, Eugene-Antoine-Horace, Comte de
Choiseul (1837-1915).
do

~s

Thie rs explained that this was necessary to

France had every reason to maintain good relations with Italy

as well.

Realizing the sensitivity of Rome on this matter, Thie rs

explained that as much thought and effort had gone in naming Choiseul as naming Harcourt, with the hope that both men, found to be
extremely capable for the delicate missions entrusted to themi would
be acceptable to the Vatican.
Chigi then stated that if there were insuperable roadblocks
to France giving the Pope a complete remedy, what would France
think or do if some of the other powers of Europe, viz. Bavaria,
Austria, and possibly Prussia would resort to concerted action to
protect the Pope?

Thie rs answered that he was totally unaware of
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any such plans being in the wind and that at any rate France would
not surrender to those other powers the right of protecting the Holy
Father which she had traditionally held.
For a closing remark, Thiers expressed the opinion that it
was his wish that Pius IX should stay on in the precinct of the Vatican as long as possible until better times had come.

23

23

Rapp 1728, March 31, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 9,
fols. 98-100.
Comte d'Harcourt had served earlier in French diplomatic
posts in the German states under the July Monarchy and the Second
Republic.
He resigned his post at Stuttgart after the Coup of
December 2, 1851, and remained in private life until the 1871 appointment to Rome.
His father, Francois-Eugene-Gabrielg due
d'Harcourt (1786-65) had been French ambassador to Rome during
the troubles there in 1849-51.
The Harcourt family archives
were destroyed by fire in 1944.
The Due de Corcelles had previously been a member of the Corps Legistatif in the Second Em pire.
The appointment to Italy was his first diplomatic post.
Later, he became' an active Republican.
The concerted action proposal about which Chigi and Thiers
talked, was one of many which came up during the months after
September 20, 1870.
These are all discussed in their entirety
through the many pages of the prestigious work by S. William Halperin, Italy and the Vatican at War: A Study of Their Relations
from the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War to the Death of
Pius IX (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939). Halperin 1 s
is the premier guide for studying the European outlook on the
Roman Question during these years.
Unfortunately he makes only
three references to Chigi.
Halperin refers to disclaimers by Thie rs of participation in
joint action with the other powers, disclaimers which were made
prior to the March 30 conference with Chigi, pp. 188-90.
The remark by Thiers about Pius IX staying on at the Vatican is the only reference found by all of Chigi's correspondence
about Pius 1 being rumored to be leaving Rome or about France
offering him a refuge.
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On the following day, March 31, Chigi held a conference with

Jules Favre whom he had not seen since the negotiations with Bismarck in the previous September and October.

Favre explained to

Chigi that he had given Harcourt two general guidelines for the conduct of his mission to Rome.

First he was to maintain an attitude

of reserve on all that touched upon the question of the Temporal
Power.

Secondly, he was to be constantly alert that the person of

the Holy Father was respected.

The new ambassador to Italy had

been instructed in the same manner, and Favre assured Chigi that
Choiseul was the very man for that position.
Chigi said he hoped that the French government would carry
out its policy and that the government of Florence would not throw
itself in the way.

Chigi then asked Favre, as he had asked Thiers,

what he thought of.the reported plans of Bavaria, Austria, and
Prussia.

Favre responded that the only thing he had heard along

those lines was that those powers had discussed what they would do
when the Italian government moved to Rome.

Each seemed inclined

to name one emissary to both Pius IX and Victor Emmanuel and that
an ecclesiastic would be named as a sort of assistant ambassador
who would handle strictly religious affairs.

Favre said he under-

stood that Antonelli had already heard this proposal and had broadly

r
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With the conclusion of this conference, a semblance of normalcy appeared to have emerged.

Chigi had presented his creden-

tials, regular contact with the foreign minister had been established,
and the French government had been set up in a central capital.
Things might have been normal for Flavio Chigi, and he might have
been able to work unhindered toward his intended goal of getting the
French to come to the papal rescue had not the storm of the Com mune then brewing in Paris presented another drastic interruption.

·24
Rapp 1730, April 1, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R

165~

f 8, fols.

63 -64.

A large bulk of twenty-two volumes of Jules Favre 1 s papers
is stored in the AMAE, Papiers des Agents du MAE, Inventaire
No. 55.
The exchanges between Favre and Chigi concerning the
evacuation of the diplomatic corps from Paris (discussed in Chapter IV) are all that these twenty-two volumes yielded pertinent to
this dissertation.
Favre' s Rome et La R~publique Francaise (Paris, 1871),
his personal testimony on Papal-Franco relations during the period
and his disapproval of France rushing to the pope's aid, likewise
contains virtually nothing regarding Chigi.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNE AND THE FADING HOPE IN THE
SUMMER OF 1871

The disjointed state of political affairs in France to which
Flavio Chigi had given such vexatious attention during his days in
Tours and Bourdeaux attained its fiery climax with the outbreak of
the Commune of Paris in March of 1871.

All of Chigi's fears of

diabolical revolutionaries and agitating socialists materialized when
the National Guard of Paris raised its standard of opposition to the
Versailles government.

A whole new set of problems and troubles

confronted the Apostolic Nuncio, all of which he could have done
without.

A government upon which Chigi and Rome depended for

aid in the long run was now severely threatened from within and
would be distracted for an indefinite period while facing the Commune.

France had been battered enough by the. Prussians to suffer

protracted internal discord.
Within the city of Paris itself, the difficulties were enormous.

The Commune regime had proclaimed separation of Church

and state, freedom of education, equality of man, and other dangerous doctrines.

The regime was closing churches and convents
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and was arresting priests.

Chief among these was the archbishop,

Georges Darboy (1813-1871).

The situation of being an outside

witness might have been Chigi's fate during the days of the Commune.
The normal expectation would have been for him to send a narration
of events to Rome and a description of the efforts of the Versailles
government against the Commune.

Such a mere stand-by role was

to be denied Chigi as he expended strenuous energy to secure Archbishop Darboy's release.
Darboy had remained in Paris throughout the entire siege
and had won much acclaim for his efforts on behalf of the plight of
the citizens.

This esteem was not enough to prevent his arrest by

the Commune government.

Chigi was first informed of the arrest

while on a stop at Poitiers on the journey from Bourdeaux to Versailles.

After a!"riving in Versailles, Chigi tried fervently to

grasp the situation and ascertain the conditions under which Darboy
'

was being detained.

Despite ·versailles being only twenty miles

from the city of Paris proper, communication was virtually impossible given the siege of the city now being maintained by the troops
of the Versailles government.
The hands-tied dilemma was changed when, in early April,
the Vicar-General of Paris, Abb~ Lagarde, arrived in Versailles
bearing news and messages from Darboy.

Lagarde explained to

Chigi some of Darboy's motivation in submitting to arrest, namely

r
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that Darboy and the other clerics imprisoned did not see fit to abandon their posts in the face of the new enemy.
Church had prompted them to resist.

Their love for the

l

Lagarde had come to Versailles for reasons other than to
pay a courtesy call on the papal nuncio.

He was the intermediary

in the scheme of proposing to Thie rs an exchange of prisoners held
by the Versailles government (notably Louis Blanqui) for Darboy
and other prominent hostages being held by the Commune.

Lagarde

informed Chigi of this mission, and Chigi took a hand in the matter
by making his own appeal to Thie rs several days later.

In this

interview, Thiers attempted to brush off Chigi's pleas by explaining
as much as he admired the hostages and sympathized with their
plight, he could in no way have any dealings of this nature with the
insurrectionists. , Undaunted, Chigi tried to point out the risk to
the life of the prisoners because of the character of their captors
and the possibility of an attack by the Parisian populace.

Thie rs

countered by saying that the situation in the city was one of public
calm, and one did not have to fear a mob attack.

Nonetheless,

Thiers said he would discuss the matter with his cabinet.

l

2

Rapp 1736, n. d., ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165, f 8,
fols. 81-82.
2

rbid. , fols. 82-84.
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Chigi was not to be put off by Thie rs' rebuff but decided to
push on and call on other persons who might be able to help Darboy.
Accordingly, Chigi established contact with the American minister,
Washburne, who had helped Chigi so much the previous autumn during the negotiations with Bismarck.

During the intervening months,

Washburne had conducted himself admirably by acting as liaison
between the Prussians and the French.

Washburne had likewise

endeared himself to the citizens of Paris because he had stayed on
in the city throughout the siege.

Perhaps Washburne's influence

with all parties --the Versailles group, the Communards, and the
Prussians who were never very far away at any time--would enable
him to be of some help.
On April 22, Washburne arrived in Versailles and called

on Chigi.

Washburne expressed his outrage that Archbishop Dar-

boy had been confined, saying that he fully sympathized with Chigi's
feeling and how Darboy's arrest had caused a stir throughout the
Catholic world.

Washburne pledge that he would do everything in

his power to secure Darboy 1 s release, though his action would be
entirely unofficial and would be restricted by the neutral policy of
his home government.

The American minister then gave Chigi a

report on Darboy's condition which Chigi forwarded to Rome.

For

the next several weeks, Washburne worked feverishly for Darboy's
freedom.

He made a number of visits to Darboy in his cell at the
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LaRoquette prison, being one of the few persons allowed to do so.
Washburne made a number of direct overtures to Darboy's captor,
General Cluseret, all of which efforts were to prove futile.

3

The direct and indirect entreaties to Thie rs were proving
fruitless.

Chigi's efforts to use Washburne 1s connections like-

wise were meeting without success, although Washburne displayed
much greater cooperation.

As the troops of the Versailles gov-

ernment were moving in on the city, Chigi explored one more
method that might lead to Darboy's release.
sought the aid of the Prussians.

On May 19 Chigi

He went, on the suggestion of

Lord Lyons, to the Prince of Saxony, who was the commandant of
the Prussian occupation forces headquartered at Soisy-sous Montmorency.

Chigi was told by General Fabrice, the Prince's

adjutant, that both the Prince and the general himself had been
negotiating for some time with the leaders of the Commune, in
'
particular with Cluseret, for the release of the prominent hostages.
Fabrice said that the Prussian efforts had been undertaken by the
direct orders of Bismarck.

3

Nonetheless, the .Prussians were

Rapp
(no number), April 26, 1871, loc. cit., fols.
85-86, and Washburne, Recollections, II, p. 166.
Chigi and
Washburne met face to face only on this one occasion and maintained little correspondence during Commune.
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making no headway either.

4

Five days later, on May 24, Archbishop Darboy was shot at
La Roquette along with several others.

The act was among the

last carried out by the Commune which was suffering its own death
in those very hours.

In the next several days, Chigi interviewed

various witnesses of the shooting or persons who had seen Darboy
in his last days.

Several gave rather impressive reports on the

Archbishop's strength and firmness, and Chigi was able to write to
Rome that Darboy had "gone towards death with calm and courage. 115
In early June, Chigi returned to Paris for the first time in
eight months.

Of major concern to him was the condition of Church

properties in the city, which he found to be not too severe.

In a

cer'ta in sense he took interim control of the affairs of the archdiocese of Paris by holding meetings with the metropolitan chapter,
visiting damaged churches, distributing a papal relief donation of
50, 000 francs, and making moves to choose Darboy 1 s successor.

On June 7, Chigi presided at the solemn funeral service in Notre
Dame at which he gave the absolution.

The funeral was held on a

4 Rapp 1747, May 24, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 242, f 2, fols.
173-174; Joseph-Alfred Card. Foulon, Histoire de la Vie et des
Oeurves de Mgr. Darboy (Paris, 1889), pp. 555-567; and Lord
Newton, Lord Lyons, I, p. 387.

5

Rapp 1748, May 29, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 165,
f 8, fols. 93-94.
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grand scale at public expense to show that the Commune had been
completely overcome.

Chigi thought that the huge multitude which

turned out indicated that the sentiments of the Parisians was definitely in favor of the Church rather than the Commune.

6

The troubles in Paris, while causing Chigi much anguish
and sleepless nights, did not keep him completely distracted from
his major duty, obtaining help for the Holy See and keeping alive in
the mind of the French government the plight of the imprisoned
Pius IX.

Even through the days of the Commune, Chigi found time

to devote himself to this most sacred part of his mission.

As the

violence and disruption continued at Paris, the nuncio found him self pursuing some old familiar paths and utilizing new approaches
as .incidents and movements within French politics presented much
hope.
On April 8, 1871, Chigi held another conference with Favre.

The Foreign Minister was quite eager to know if indeed Pius IX was
under lock and key in the Vatican and was not allowed to leave.
Chigi assured him that the pope was indeed a prisoner and took

Rapp 1750, June 6, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 115~117 and
Rapp 1752, June 8, 1871, loc. ci.t., fols. 103-105; Foulon, pp.
566-567; and Washburne, II, pp. 185-186.
In his L'Eglise de Paris sous la Commune, Pers~cution et
Martyrs (Paris, 1871), Alfred Rastoul makes no mention that any
damage was done by the Communards to the Nunciature building.
The same is true of other books on the Commune.
6

-131-

heart that Favre was slowly becoming convinced of the difficulty
facing the Holy Father.

Going on from this point, Chigi said that

the Holy Father's position was intolerable and that the Powers and
especially France could no longer stand idly by and thus by their
silence be a party t.o the reprobate action of the government of
Florence.

Chigi repeated he was fully aware of the miserable cir-

cumstances facing France but that surely, it seemed to him, France
in concert with the other Powers could offer moderate yet definitive
remonstrances to the government of Florence on such things as the
Italian plan to transfer the capital to Rome and the continuing seiz ure of religious buildings in Rome by the invaders.
Favre said he did not see the international importance of
the Italian government expropriating four or five convents.

Chigi

reiterated that such actions should be of concern to the Powers
because they were theft from the Holy Father.

Favre asked how

I

Chigi thought the Powers could stop the transfer of the capital.
Chigi admitted the difficulty of actually stopping the Italians, but,
he said, this should not hinder any concerted appeals.

Favre

ended the discussion by asserting his earlier premise that any
concerted action could not be attempted by the Powers without a
previous consultation with the Holy Father.

Although Favre did

not explicitly say so, he evidently felt that such an arrangement
was the only feasible one, and he was chastising Pius IX indirectly
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7

If Favre was proving to be as stubborn and unsympathetic as

ever about the Roman Question, other elements in the French government were stirring up their enthusiasm about helping the pope.
Plans were afoot in the Monarchist Assembly by early April of 1871
for an interpellation of the government on its views.

Chigi was

ecstatic over these developments, and he wrote to Rome on April 12
that the deputies were pursuing a very practical means of action.

.

The plan, as he understood it, was for the Assembly to make a
declaration of its belief of the necessity of the Temporal Sovereignty
of the Holy Father in order for him to have liberty and independence
for the exercise of his apostolic ministry.

Then the Assembly

would call upon the new government to take part with other states to
restore the rights, of the Holy See.

8

Another bright ray of hope appeared on the horizon when the
French episcopate began sending petitions to the Assembly demanding action on the part of the French government.

On May 3, Chigi

received Cardinal Henri Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, as a
guest at Versailles.

7
8

In this rare conference with a member of the

Rapp 1733, April 8, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 68-69.

Rapp 1735, April 12, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 78-79 and Rapp
1744, May 31, 1871, loc. cit., fols. 113-114.
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French hierarchy, Chigi found out many details of how a collective
address from the bishops would be made to the Assembly, that a
circular was to be sent to all French bishops, and how he (Cardinal Bonnechose) was leading the movement.

It was hoped that the

petitions of the bishops would be accompanied by demonstrations
and other expressions of sentiment on the part of the laity.

9

Finally, the most brilliant champion of all Catholic and
papal causes came on the sce)'fe in the person of the Comte de Chambord (1820-1883).

On May 8, 1871, Chambord issued one of his

famous letters, this one going to Joseph de Carayon-Latour, a
Legitimatist leader in the Assembly.

Chambord spoke very heav-

ily of his religious feelings, making reference to such feelings as
"I 9nly bring back peace, religion, and concord," and "If France
is to be saved, God must reign there as master and then I can reign
as king. "

The phrases which struck home for the French clericals,

for Chigi, and for Rome were: "The freedom of the Church is the
prime condition of peace of spirit and order in the world.

To pro-

tect the Holy See was ever the honor of our country and the most
incontestible cause of its grandeur among nations.

Only in periods

of the greatest misfortune has France abandoned this glorious pat-

9

Rapp 1742, May 3, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R 242,
f 2, fols. 159-160.
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ronage.''

10

Laying bare his feelings, Chigi described this letter as "one
of the most important political events for France."

The appeal,

replete with its rejection of strife and violence, has been received
with universal favor by the French people and had won the admiration of Chambord's adversaries everywhere.

Already the Orlean-

ists were ready to rally around Chambord's leadership.

Despite

Chigi's obvious and overwhelming partiality towards the Legitimatist cause and his overestimation of the success of Chambord's letter, he did not in any way specifically indicate how he felt what
Chambord 1 s coming to the throne would affect the Roman Question.
As the summer of 1871 opened, the state of affairs in the
Roman Question had taken several critical turns.
nuel had already made one visit to Rome.

Victor Emma-

The Italian parliament

had debated long and hard and had after great difficulty passed the
'
Law of Guarantees on May 13. The Italian government had taken
control of a number of public buildings in Rome for housing minis -

lOHalperin, pp. 198-199 and Marvin L. Brown, The Comte
de Chambord: the Third Republic's Uncompromising King (Durham, 1967), pp. 86-87.

11

Rapp 1754, May 17, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 169-172.
In early July of 1871, Chambord made a brief, incognito visit to
Paris, but there is no indication in Chigi's reports or in Brown,
pp. 89-90, that the nuncio met with the Pretender.

11
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tries, buildings which had previously been papal property.

These

takeovers had been regarded as theft and sacrilege by the Vatican,
and official protests were issued on each occasion.

As has been

seen, Chigi had often brought up these protests in conversations
with Favre.

The last step remaining was for the Italian government

to officially move from Florence to Rome.

The date for this was

set for July 1, 1871.
An important aspect of the transfer would be whether the
diplomatic corps in Florence would accompany the government, thus
signalling international sanction of the seizure of Rome.

The Holy

See would of course rather not see this happen, though there was
little it was able to do to prevent it.

Nonetheless, Chigi would talk

to Favre about having the French ambassador Choiseul either stay
behind in Florence or come home in protest.

The transfer of the

Italia:q capital would coincide with some of the debates in the French
Assembly on the Roman Question and the discussion of France's
form of government.

The monarchists and other conservatives

were beginning to flex their muscles vis -a-vis Thie rs on these matters, and it was clear that a showdown was pending.

On June 21, Chigi held what was to prove to be his last conference with Favre.

The main topic of conversation was the im-

pending Italian move to Rome.

Favre indicated that the official

notice had been communicated to the Florence diplomatic corps and
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that the date had been announced.

Choiseul had already telegraphed

to Versailles asking for instructions.

Favre said in a subdued

manner that no decision had been taken and that he was waiting for
further developments.

France was interested in what the other

Powers were thinking, and Favre was going to consult with the Austrian ambassador Metternich shortly.
Chigi forcefully emphasized that the French ambassador in
Florence should not follow the government to Rome.

Whatever

the other Powers would do should not impede France in her deciFrance must do what it could to head off the scandal of tacit

sion.

approval of the invasion of Rome which would be the result in the
eyes of Europe of the presence in Rome of the diplomatic corps accredited to Victor Emmanuel.
Favre thought that one of two things might happen: one,
that the Foreign Ministry might be going by itself to Rome without
'

the King, the other that Victor Emmanuel and his entire government were going to permanently move.

If it were a case of only

the Italian Foreign Ministry making the change,. no problems would
emerge if Choiseul did not accompany it.

But if the second even-

tuality proved to be true, which was more likely, then the gravest
difficulties would arise, and Favre wanted utmost to avoid rupturing relations with Italy.

Chigi ended the discussion by repeating

that even in this case he still saw no reason for the French am bas -

r
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12
sador to go to Rome.
On June 27, Chigi gained an audience with Thie rs to try his

luck with the Chief Executive.

On being questioned as to whether

Choiseul would be instructed to go to Rome, Thiers indicated that
he had been in contact with the cabinets of Austria and Prussia and
that they were inclined to instruct their representatives to move
with the Italian government.

While France had indeed considered

telling Choiseul to remain behind, she found it very tedious to follow such a course as so doing would put France in complete isolation from the other European states.

13

As the appointed day for the transfer of the capital to Rome
approached, Chigi grew more desperate.

Uncertainty existed in

diplomatic circles as 'to how many of its bureaucratic offices the
Italian government would move to Rome or whether Victor Emma nuel
city.

~ould

simply make a symbolic, ceremonial entrance into the

Undaunted, Chigi made an eleventh-hour appeal to Favre on

June 30 by sending a strongly worded note (the two men did not
meet personally} that Choiseul not be permitted to go to Rome.

12

Rapp 1755, June 21, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, A 1871, R
165, f 8, fols. 120-123. According to Halperin, pp. 150-152, Favre
was hoping that the Italians would merely make Rome an "honorary
capital." In this Rapp 1755, Chigi further quotes Favre as hinting
that he did not think the transfer would take place.
13

Rapp 1756, June 27, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 125-128.
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Chigi pointed out once again how the presence of the French am bas sador in Rome would be a French sanction of the Italian invasion
and that such a move would mean an abandonment of France 1 s traditional policy toward the Holy See.

If Choiseul was actually to

make the trip to Rome along with Victor Emmanuel, then the Versailles government should issue a declaration that this action implied little or no significance.

14

Favre sent a speedy reply the next day.

He said that he

had shown Chigi 's letter to Thie rs but that Thie rs insisted that
France must still maintain its good relations with the Kingdom of
Italy and that a line of conduct would be followed which would be for
the benefit of all.

Choiseul had been given permission to return to

France in order to take part in the Assembly where he still held a
seat.

Choiseul was to retain his position as ambassador but would

not have to face up to the task of accompanying Victor Emmanuel to
Rome.

Instead, the French charge d'affaires was to go to Rome no

earlier than July 5, pay his respects, and then return immediately
to Florence until the situation had improved.
This is approximately what occurred.

15
Most of the officials

14Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, ASV, Segr di St, R 165, f 9,
fols. 106-109.
15

Favre to Chigi, July 1, 1871, ASV, loc. cit., fols. 110-111.
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of the Italian government arrived in Rome on July 1 when the official proclamation of Rome as the capital of Italy was made.

Victor

Emmanuel entered the next day and took possession of the Quirinale
as his residence.

Across the city, at the Vatican, an uneasy quiet

prevailed, but no stern condemnations were issued.

Late appeals

to Piux IX to leave the city in protest were ignored.

A conspicu-

ous part of the scene was the absence not only of Choiseul, but also
of the Austrian, Belgian, and Prussian ministers to Italy, all of
whose governments had instructed them to stay away for the time
being so as to retain some gesture of respect for the claims of
.
IX o f sovereignty
.
Pius
over Rome. 16
Despite the deference shown by the Versailles government
in instructing Choiseul to stay away from Rome for a while, Chigi
had found that Favre was in fact as unhelpful as ever and Thiers
continued to be even more adamant in his refusal to take up the
papal cause.

There remained one more arena where hope still

flickered--the Assembly where the long-awaited debates and interpellations on the Roman Question were about to take place.

The

petitions of the bishops were flowing in daily to Versailles.

Simi-

lar declarations from Catholic lay groups were also pouring in.
Distinguished politicians of some of France 1 s oldest and most

16

Halperin, pp. 163-165.
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Catholic families were organizing their forces.
Although Chigi made a number of quick trips to Versailles
to be close to the scene and met occasionally with some of the conservative leaders, he seems to have re·mained in the background,
keeping in mind his position as a diplomat and undoubtedly remembering the slaps on the wrist he had suffered earlier from Napoleon
III when he had intervened in French domestic affairs.

Chigi re-

ported, for example, what such persons as Joinville, the due
d 'Aumale, Kolb, Pojot, Cardinal Bonnechose, and Bishop Dupanloup were doing and how they were working with one another.

But

such reports were done evidently only as a part of Chigi 1 s function
as the pope's chief observer.

Chigi 1 s dispatches, the biographies

of some of these individuals, and the histories of this phase of
French politics indicate that no active role was taken by the nuncio.

17
By July of 1871, the two separate movements were now

fusing into one: the petitions of the bishops and laity and the activity of the conservative deputies.

The deputies -0.ecided to use the

petitions as a base for their debates and move for a vote that these
petitions be handed over to the Foreign Ministry for action.

17

As

Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, loc. cit. and Rapp 1763, July
19, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f 8, fols. 133-135.
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the entire matter was technically an internal political affair for the
moment, Favre as Foreign Minister was not directly involved.

He

seems to have faded from the picture as far as Chigi is concerned
since he did not see Favre during the interpellation proceedings.
The central figure, it was quite clear to Chigi, was still Adolphe
Thie rs.

On July 2, secondary elections were held for about one hundred members of the Assembly.

The republican elements gained

significantly much to the joy of Thiers who still mistrusted both
the Bourbons and the Orleanists.

Chigi's opinion of the outcome

was that although the Thie rs forces were quite satisfied, the monarchists were by no means desolated.

Chigi felt that the augmen-

tation of the republican party in the Assembly would not present any
18
.
. th e course o f t h e upcom1ng
.
.
11atlon.
.
serious
o b stac 1e ln
1nterpe
Thiers remained the man of the hour.

On July 9, Chigi

wrote to Rome that the Chief of the Executive power was refraining
for the moment from any decisive act which would indicate that he
favored the Temporal Sovereignty or from taking any action which
would compromise the relations between France and the government of Victor Emmanuel.

Thie rs wanted to stay away from any

declaration of the necessity of the Temporal Power.

18

Rapp 17_, July 2, 1871, loc. cit.

Peace with
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Italy was uppermost in his mind.

Above all, Thiers did not want

a pronouncement from the Assembly which would commit France
to action.

Chigi 's overall opinion was that Thie rs was essentially

recognizing the powerlessness of France, but that to look beyond
Thie rs 1 "veil of ambition,

11

one could still see that in his heart

Thiers still favored the rights and privileges of the Church.

19

The culminating debate on the Roman Question took place
in the Assembly on July 22, 1871.

Thiers rendered a long and

famous speech in which he reiterated his personal devotion to the
Holy Father and his essential belief in the necessity of the independence of the Holy See but rejected any action by France because
of her own weakness and because of the international scene which
called for peace and not war.

Italy was a respected member of

the European com·munity with many friends (particularly the new
Germc:i-n Empire), and France did not wish to upset the present
equilibrium.

If the pope were ever threatened, France would pro-

tect his person or always offer him a place of refuge.

An expedi-

tion to Rome was out of the question.
After the speech, the Assembly went through prolonged
debate and finally voted an order of the day (not a statute or official act of government) which assigned the episcopal petitions to

l9Rapp 1759, July 9, ASV, loc. cit., 101-103.
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the Foreign Office for study and consultation.

The Assembly in

effect showed how it felt emotionally but had delivered the matter
.into the manifestly unwilling hands of Jules Favre.

20

Despite all the drama that seemed to be building up and all
the hopes of the clericals, the outcome was a languid statement and
a technical evasion.

It now seemed that everyone i.n France (ex-

cept perhaps for Chambord): Thiers, Favre, the conservatives
and monarchists, the cardinals and bishops in the Assembly, were
all singing the same chorus --Holy Mother the Church had been
raped, the independence of the Holy Father was necessary for the
functioning of his office, Pi.we IX was a prisoner, but there is nothing we can do about it.
Chigi was under no illusion about the hollow victory that had
been achieved in the Assembly vote.

Writing to Rome four days

later, ,. he described the outcome as being insignificant when compared to the sufferings and indignities endured by the Holy Father.
Chigi. expressed his disappointment at the vote even though what had
happened was entirely expected.

Chigi realized how the Roman

Question was intricately involved with the multi-faceted political
structure of France and the changing international scene: a stronger Italy, a weak France, the new Germany, and so on.

20

Halperin, pp. 213-214.

The anti-
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papal press in France had declared that the July 22 vote was the
last that shall be seen or heard from the French government regarding the Roman Question, but Chigi discounted such statements
as attempts to mislead public opinion.

The major result of the

vote was that the majority of the Assembly had not given up their
support of the Holy See but had deferred the question for the time
being.

They had not excluded decisive action but had merely

postponed it.
Now that the petitions had been sent to the Quai d'Orsay,
the door was still left open for another interpellation despite the
fact that the Foreign Minister's principles were contrary to the
idea of the Temporal Power.

When the next interpellation could

arise, Chigi felt, depended on how long Favre remained in office
and how well the majority held together.

Since Favre had voted

against the proposal, demands were being raised for his resignation.
More than Favre, Chigi understood that Thiers was still
the great hindrance.

Chigi repeated how so much of Thie r's

speech had referred to the relationship between the Roman Question
and the general European situation.

It was impossible to alter

present conditions to the point where the Roman Question might be
fortuitously brought up again.

Chigi simply hoped that "an irre-

sistable germ might remain alive in his [Thie rs 1]

breast'' to some

-145-

day go ahead with his conviction.

21

Favre resigned soon after the vote because of his total disapproval of France taking any steps whatever towards active support of Pius IX's claims.

He was succeeded by Claude Remusat

(1797-1875), an old friend of Thiers and a life-long republican.
Remusat was to prove to be as courteous yet as evasive as Favre
or most other French officials.

The petitions which had gone to

the Foreign Ministry were buried there not to surface again.

The

affirmation of Thiers as President of the Republic at the end of
August, 1871, and the continued drift towards the entrenchment of
the Third Republic in later years insured that the Eldest Daughter
of the Church was not going to rescue the Supreme Pontiff from 4is
prison cell.
Thus, by ttie end of the summer of 1871, Archbishop Flavio
Chigi had
lived through a harrowing eighteen months of political
•.
intrigue, international crises, the death of an empire, and the collapse of the 1000-year-old Temporal Power.

He had dealt with

three mercurial and difficult heads of state: Napoleon III, Trochu,

21

Rapp 1764, July26, 1871, ASV, A 1871, R 165, f8,
fols. 146-148.
Halperin indicates that even Antonelli was not
carried away by the vote of July 22.
Antonelli told the Austrian
ambassador to the Holy See, "In the present situation of France,
if I had to speak before a French chamber, I would have spoken no
differently." Pp. 218-219.
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and Thie rs.

He had worked with six different foreign ministers,

none of which had brought him much satisfaction.

Chigi had endured

eight months of exile in dreary provincial cities.

The city of his

birth and of his Holy Father was in the hands of an excommunicated
despoiler, while the Paris to which he had so long been assigned
was ravaged by siege, bombardment, and Commune.

It is little

wonder that by July of 1871, Chigi spoke of controlling within himself "un sentimento di profonda tristezza.

22

1122

Rapp, 1764, July 26, 1871, loc. cit., fol. 146v.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The tenure of Archbishop Flabio Chigi as Apostolic Nuncio
to Paris lasted approximately three years after 1871.
proved far less momentous than the first nine years.

This period
Whereas the

Sixties had been replete with a continuous round of international
crises, Napoleonic intrigues, and embarrassing faux pas by the
nuncio; and whereas 1870 and 1871 represented an unending series
of failure, disappointment, exile, and frustration, the time from
the, Assembly vote in July of 1871 and Chigi's departure from France
in May of 1874 wa.s virtually laggard.

France was internally peace -

ful, the Republic gained strength, the international scene was dormant, and the Roman Question garnered so little interest as to
become a dead letter.
Chigi 's influence in diplomatic circles in Paris and his appe rances at the Quai d'Orsay diminished significantly.

Before the

dawn of the Third Republic, Chigi had very ready access to both
sovereigns and foreign ministers.

Hardly a month went by without

an appointment with a foreign minister.

During the months of the

Franco-Prussian War and the Government of National Defense, his
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meetings with Caudordy, Favre, and Thiers were regular and fre quent.
From the summer of 1871 on, Chigi was far less welcome
in government offices than he had been before.

Throughout all of

1872, Chigi had one meeting with Thiers and only three with the
foreign minister, mostly to discuss the plight of persecuted Arme nian Catholics in the Turkish Empire.
1873.

The same held true for

Chigi had one conference with Thiers before the President's

resignation in May of that year, and he had the opportunity to meet
with Thiers 1 successor, Marshall MacMahon, only to present his
credentials to the new Chief of State.
ments with foreign ministers.

There were but two appoint-

1

In one important area, Chigi did make a crucial contribution by bringing a"bout a subtle change in the nomination procedure
of bishops.
The portfolio of the Minister of Cults was held by the
'
notorious anti-clerical Jules Simon.
During the 1870's a remarkable number of staunchly pro-papal and conservative candidates
for French sees were approved by the Republican government.
Chigi had a direct hand in this as he was the one who proposed the
names to Simon who seemed all too eager to grant approvals.

1
ASV, Segr di St, Rubricelle, #351 (1871), #358 (1872),
#365 (1873), and #372 (1874).
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Chigi seized the initiative as early as March of 1871 when in an
early audience with Thiers, Chigi found the Chief Executive somewhat disinterested in the business of naming bishops.

Chigi later

had little difficulty in securing the nomination of Archbishop Gus tave Guibert of Tours as Archbishop of Paris shortly after Darboy's death.

Thereafter, government confirmation of episcopal

candidates was virtually automatic.

The episode led to Bishop

Dupanloup 1s famous remark that Simon would get a Red Hat sooner
than he would.

2

On December 22, 1873, Flavio Chigi was among those
named cardinal in the first consistory announced by Pius IX after

2 Rapp 1721, ASV, Segr di St, March 10, 1871, ASV, Segr
di St, A 1871, R 165, f 9, fols. 84-87.
Jacques Gadille, in his La Pens~e et l 'action politique des
eveques Francais au d~but de la Ille R~publique, I, pp. 286-288,
explor'es more fully this aspect of Chigi's accomplishment.
Gadille also tells how a number of French prelates were elated to
see Chigi leave as then their own influence in naming bishops
would rise, I, pp. 19 and 293.
Some of Simon 1 s correspondence on this matter is found in
AMAE, M~moires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 117, fols. 218-307
in which he complains that Chigi was making a "pr~sentation" or
a "nomination" (Simon's original French words, thus the italicization.)
The author consulted the following works by Simon which
contained nothing about Chigi: Le Gouvernement de M. Thiers
(2 vols., Paris, 1878); Souvenirs du 4 Septembre; Le Gouvernment de la D~fense Nationale (Paris, 1876); and Souvenirs du 4
Septembre, Origine et chute de l 1Empire (Paris, 1874).
Permission could not be secured to use the file of Simon's private
papers at the Archives Nationales.
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the loss of the Temporal Power.

Others included in the group of

new cardinals were Guibert and Archbishop Regnier of Lille, who
were the first French cardinals elevated in over a decade.

In

view of Chigi's troublesome conduct under the Second Empire, his
ineffectiveness during 1870 and 1871, and his falling-out with the
Republic, it would hardly seem that he was a worthy candidate for
being a Prince of the Church.

An inescapable precedent was being

followed in elevating him to the purple, for the standing order was
well set that papal nuncios to certain important Catholic states such
as France, Austria, and Spain were automatically created cardinal
upon the completion of their appointments as nuncios.

This prac -

tise, followed to the present time, is deemed as the Holy See's
way of honoring the state to which the nuncio had been accredited.

3

Upon being- named cardinal, Chigi assumed the title of Pronuncio until the arrival of his successor.

Chigi received his Red

Hat directly from President MacMahon in the chapel of the Palace
of Versailles.

That the head of the French state conferred a

cardinal's insignia on a departing nuncio was another tradition
which was scrupulously followed.

Chigi stayed on at Paris until

3 Most of this biographical information is obtained from
the Chigi obituary in La Civiltl Cattolica, February 23, 1885,
Vol. IX della serie duodecima (Vol. 141 in total series), pp.
613-614.
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May of 1874 when his replacement, Archbishop Meglia, reached
the city to commence his duties.

Meglia was a notorious ultra-

montane who had once been Pius IX's nuncio to Maximilian of
Mexico where he offered little comfort and support to that ill-fated
monarch.

4

Cardinal Chigi spent the rest of his days at Rome, falling
victim to an old Vatican cliche: Promoveatur ut amoveatur, that
is, "Let him be promoted that he may be removed."

He served

on a number of councils of congregations of the Holy See, but these
functions were largely honorific.

His fate was that of many a

lonely cardinal in Rome: many titles but no power.

Thus he held

such grant sounding posts as Grand Prior of the Knights of Malta
and Jerusalem, Archpriest of St. John Lateran Basilica, Secretary
of Apostolic Briefs, and Cardinal-Protector of the St. Vincent de

.

Paul Society •

5

In the 1878 consistory which elected Leo XIII, Chigi was not
considered a serious candidate for the papal throne.

In the French

Foreign Ministry Archives, there is a collection of dossiers on

4

Ibid., and ASV, Segr di St, Rubricella #372 (1874). Details on Meglia 's mission in Mexico can be found in Joan Haslip,
The Crown of Mexico; Maximilian and His Empress Carlota (New
York, 1971).
5

La Civilt'a Cattolica, loc. cit.
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cardinals at the time of the conclave, a series put together to inform the Qua i d 'Orsay of the prospects to be faced as to the kind
of pope any cardinal would make.

In the report on Chigi, he is

described as "a man of the world,

a man of little talent and

mediocre elevation of ideas, • • . and a fanatic infallibist."

The

report concluded that Chigi's only hope of becoming pope was the
reputation of his family name and the fact that there had previously
been a Chigi pope, Alexander VII.

6

On February 16, 1885, Flavia Cardinal Chigi died after a
long illness at the age of 74.

At the time of his death, he was the

last cardinal from the Roman nobility.

He was buried in the Chigi

family tomb in his titular church of Santa Maria del Popolo.

7

So lengthy a span as Chigi 's twelve years in an important
diplomatic post is' difficult to appraise briefly.

There seems no

doubt that, taken as a whole, Chigi was an incompetent ambassador.

The repeated mistakes and interferences of the 1860 1 s, the

numerous conflicts with various French ministries, the arguments
with members of the hierarchy, and the embarrassing episode of
the public apology to the Emperor were all affairs which add up to

6

AMAE, Memoires et Documents, Rome, Vol. 109, fols.
16-17 and 82.
7

La Civilta Cattolica, loc. cit.
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a very sorry record of accomplishment.

That the Dean of the

Diplomatic Corps should have behaved in a far more restrained
demeanor hardly needs be stated.
When the writings and biographies of the other members of
the Diplomatic Corps present in Paris are considered (persons such
as Lyons, Metternich, Nigra, even Washburne), very little is to be
found in reference to the Apostolic Nuncio.

Chigi 's prominence

both social and political among his fellow ambassadors was virtually nil.

This should not have been the case in view of such factors

as: Chigi 1 s position as Dean, France's being a Catholic state, the
importance of Napoleon Ill's Roman policy, and the immense meas ure of public standing enjoyed by the Paris Diplomatic Corps during
the· Second Empire.
One of the ·more astonishing facts about Chigi was his lack
of influence or contacts with the full-blooded clerical Empress
'
Bugenie.
Cause.

Here supposedly was an eminent champion of the Papal
Here was the woman who allegedly said, "Better the

Prussians on the Seine than the Italians on the Tiber.

11

Yet the

chief representative of the Holy Father accredited to the Second
Empire met the Empress only on the highest of ceremonial occasions and in the most formal manner.

The intimacy which grew

up between Eug~nie and other members of the Diplomatic Corps,
especially Metternich and his fashionable wife Pauline, was not to
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be the case with the Nuncio.

In the last troubled hours of the Second

Empire, Eugenie was helped in her escape from the Tuileries by
Metternich and Nigra.

Chigi's whereabouts are patently unknown.

Chigi was stringently negligent in not trying to establish better
liaison.

8

As regards other important personages in the French government, Chigi 's ascendancy was equally low.
or chamber deputy was his confidante.
contacts at the Quai d'Orsay.

No cabinet member

There were no important

All the foreign ministers he dealt

with received him very politely yet usually managed to be impec cably evasive.

Ambassadors are not supposed to have spies and

friends working for them, but they always do.

Here again, the

Apostolic Nuncio was woefully lacking.

In operating in such seclusion and isolation from the proper

8

The author made extensive searches into numerous biographies of Empress Eug·enie, memoirs of members of the court
of Napoleon III, and descriptions of social life in Paris during
the 1860's.
Only one work yielded even a morsel: Harold Kurtz,
The Empress Eugenie, 1826-1920 (Boston, 1964), pp. 173-174
wherein Eugenie is quoted as stating some opinions about Mexican
affairs to the nuncio.
Kurtz does not footnote this quotation.
See the bibliography for the other works on Eug~nie looked
into by the author, too numerous to mention here. This judgment on Chigi 's lack of favor with Eugenie is
also deduced from the primary sources consulted at the Vatican
Archives and in Paris where the Empress is rarely mentioned.
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circles in Paris, Chigi was usually mistaken in his rather superficial reports to Rome on the state of French politics.

New min-

isters were rated only in terms of the level of their Catholic piety
and their devotion to the Temporal Power.

Chigi did not indicate

that he had any conviction that the Second Empire was on shaky
grounds or that Napoleon III could not be trusted, nor did he advise
Rome of these conditions.

In the long run, the shortcomings of Flavio Chigi as a nuncio created his share of the blame for the failure of papal policies
in September of 1870.

While Chigi ( or anyone else) could not

have prevented the loss of the Temporal Power, certainly he held
a very flexible position in which to operate and in which to mollify
circumstances with his official relations to both Paris and Rome.
His associations in France were so minimal or negative by the time
of the Italian invasion of the Papal States that he was useless •
•
After the double-debacle of Sedan and the 20th of September
and through the months at Tours and Bourdeaux, Chigi made something of an about-face in his modus operandi.

Hidden talents and

capabilities emerged under stress as exemplified by the courage
shown during the dilemma of the Diplomatic Corps in the face of
the siege and the change to a more pragmatic stand concerning the
Roman Question.

Despite the trouble of following a government-

in-exile, Chigi kept apace of political changes.

Chigi remained

-156considerably erroneous in some of his political judgment, such as
his description of Trochu as politically astute and the consistent
equation of republicans with re volutiona rie s.

Ch igi is to be com -

mended for shifting tactics in these days from asking for an expeditionary force to trying to coerce the French into using what
diplomatic means were available to work against the Italians.
When the forces of Thiers and Favre were back in command,
Chigi met his match.

True, he was alert at all the crucial mom-

ents: the naming of an ambassador to the Holy See, the transfer
of the capital to Rome, and the Assembly vote,

In each case,

Chigi gave his all of pleading and cajoling, of begging and imploring.
Both Thie rs and Favre were perpetually one step ahead of Chi.gi. on
all.issues.

They were both extremely shrewd (as Chigi himself

confessed), and there can be little doubt that they knew full well in
advance what kind of interview they would have with the nuncio.
The Executive Chief and the Foreign Minister of the New
Republic saw the true picture: France was defeated, the Prussians
were still in occupation, no other European state acted in protest to
the seizure of Rome, France needed peaceful relations with all its

.

neighbors including Italy, and the unsettled political storm of re publicans versus three camps of monarchists would not allow any
foreign involvement.

These overly obvious facts were continually

presented to the nuncio, who rejected them all with relentless
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repetition of his unyielding view of the necessity of the Temporal
Power for the liberty and independence of the Holy Father.
Herein was the crux of Chigi's problem.

While the French

could deal with facts and reality, Chigi 's only base was religious,
quasi-theological, and definitely emotional.

He could offer France

no distinct advantage in trying to re-establish the Temporal Power
nor could he offer any reprisals if the French did not cooperate.
He could only stubbornly speak of the involability of the Temporal
Power and of France's historic mission to protect the Holy See.
The evidence is strong that Chigi was not conscious of the difference
between the passionate nature of his stance and the actual conditions
which governed French policy.

This lack of perception molded so

much of Chigi 1 s conduct and was his own greatest deficiency which
contributed to all his other failures •

•
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